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ABSTRACT
COMMERCIAL SOLAR TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION IN THE UNITED STATES:
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON EFFECTS OF STATE POLICIES
MAY 2016
ERIC KOEGLER, B.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AT AMHERST
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AT AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Christine L. Crago
Growing concerns about greenhouse gas emissions as well as electricity prices
have led to more serious efforts by the state and federal government to provide promote
renewable energy at affordable costs. I examine the effect of policies and incentives on
added commercial solar PV capacity while controlling for pro-environmental preferences,
energy prices, geographic controls, and demographic controls. I use county-level data that
spans twelve northeastern states and the District of Columbia from 2005 through 2013. I
utilize the Tobit estimator to account for a mass point of solar PV capacity at zero
kilowatts. The results suggest that loans, performance-based incentives, rebates, sales tax
waivers, and net metering standards increase the amount of added solar PV capacity.
Solar Renewable Energy credits have a small impact on PV capacity growth, while
interconnection standard and renewable portfolio standards are not statistically
significant. If policy administrators aim to increase the amount of commercial solar PV,
then they should consider loans, rebates, and performance-based incentives as the most
effective policies.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Growing concerns about greenhouse gas emissions as well as electricity prices
have led to serious efforts across the country to provide renewable energy at affordable
costs. Amid the recent recession, factors including environmental concerns, economic
stimulus, and decreased costs of installation have caused a surge in solar photovoltaic
(PV) capacity. In 2005 solar PV had only a 0.014 percent share of net generation across
the country. By 2013, the net share of solar PV had grown to 0.106 percent. While it is
still a small part of total generation, between 2005 and 2013 utility scale solar was by far
the fastest growing generating sector in the country, increasing by 638 percent. The
closest sector in increased growth over the same period is renewables excluding
hydroelectric and solar with 154 percent growth (U.S. Energy Information
Administration (EIA), 2015b).
One reason for the incredible growth is that the cost of commercial solar has
fallen on average 10 percent per year from 1998 to 2015, which provides hope that solar
can eventually be a cost-effective solution to fossil fuels (Barbose et al., 2015). Until
solar PV costs reach parity with electricity prices, federal and state subsidies will help
customers with immense upfront costs. In 2010 solar subsidies and support totaled
roughly 1.1 billion dollars, and increased 388 percent to 5.3 billion dollars in 2013. A
large portion of the increase is due to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
which provides a 30 percent solar investment tax credit (U.S. EIA, 2015a). Cash

1

incentives, loans, and other incentive programs are distributed to three different sectors:
commercial, residential, and utility consumers.
This paper sheds light on the commercial solar PV market, whereas other relevant
literature examines the entire market or the residential market. The purpose of the paper
is to address how incentives and market tools affect total capacity of solar PV in the
Northeastern United States. The effects are measured using panel data that spans twelve
Northeastern states1 and the District of Columbia from 2005 to 2013 at the county level.
The non-linear nature of solar PV capacity and unobserved heterogeneity are addressed
by a random effects Tobit (RE Tobit) estimator. Numerous papers have discussed
residential solar growth, which accounts for 30 percent of solar PV capacity added since
1995 nationwide. Over the same period, commercial solar PV accounts for 28 percent
(Barbose et al., 2015). To my knowledge there is no paper that focuses solely on
commercial incentives. This paper fills a gap in the literature and provides administrators
with empirical evidence of commercial incentive effectiveness across the Northeastern
United States.
Previous studies have focused on the entire solar market or just the residential
market. Studies measuring solar PV market growth as a whole have mixed results.
Sarzynski et al. (2012) evaluated the effects of different types of incentives on grid tied
solar PV capacity in the United States (U.S.) from 1997 to 2009. They determined that
cash incentives are effective because they help decrease upfront costs. Carley (2009)
estimated the nationwide effect of RPS mandates on renewable generation from 1998 to

1

The states are Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and West Virginia
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2006. Results indicate that RPS mandates across the country are not significant at
increasing the share of renewable generation, but do increase total solar renewable
generation.
Residential solar PV studies have found that cash incentives are effective at
increasing solar PV capacity. Crago and Chernyakhovskiy (2014) examined the
residential solar PV market at the county level from 2005 to 2012. After controlling for
demographics and natural resources, the authors concluded that rebates are the most
effective incentive, with an additional one dollar per watt in rebates leading to a 47
percent increase in capacity, holding all else constant. Hughes and Podolefsky (2015)
used rebate data from the California Solar Initiative (CSI) from 2007 through 2012. The
results suggest a statistically significant effect from the rebate program, where a ten cent
increase in the rebate increased the number of installed projects per day by 10.1 percent,
holding all else constant. Similar efforts have been conducted in the wind sector, where
Hitaj (2012) evaluated the effects of tax credits and production incentives on wind
capacity in the U.S. from 1998 to 2007. Hitaj (2012) concluded that all of the state and
federal policies examined were statistically significant, where production incentives have
the largest effect of any policy.
The literature has grown rapidly as incentive programs continue to flourish.
However, areas such as commercial policies and their individual effects still require
attention. The contributions of this paper begin with the narrowed scope of the
commercial solar PV market. Other studies have focused on either the residential market
(Chernyakhovskiy and Crago, 2014; Hughes and Podolefsky, 2015) or the solar PV
market as a whole (Sarzynski et al., 2013; Carley, 2009). Secondly, I measure individual
3

policies so that marginal effects are not confounded. Other authors have either lumped
policies together (Carley 2009) or do not include other solar policies at all (Hughes and
Podolefsky, 2015). The third contribution is an examination of panel data, as opposed to
the cross sectional data others have used (Menz and Vachon, 2006). It is common for
authors who use panel data to address unobserved heterogeneity but not endogeneity,
both of which I address (Carley, 2009; Sarzynski et al., 2013). Finally, I account for
number of businesses by county and year. This variable is unique to the commercial
sector since the number of businesses defines the size of the commercial market.
After using an RE Tobit estimator to address the mass point of zeros and
unobserved heterogeneity in the dataset, I find that loan programs, rebates, sales tax
waivers, net metering, and performance-based incentives are all effective policies at
spurring commercial PV growth. The effects of renewable portfolio standards and
interconnection standards are not significant. Solar market factors such as solar
insolation, electricity prices, and the number of businesses in a county have a strong
effect on the amount of solar PV capacity adopted. On the other hand, income, population
density, and environmental preferences by county do not cause a statistically significant
change in solar PV capacity.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background information on
historical trends and incentives. Section 3 reviews the relevant literature. Section 4
describes the data in detail. Section 5 sets up the empirical specification and
methodology. Section 6 provides results and discussion. Section 7 explains the policy
impacts. Lastly, section 8 concludes.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
2.1 Historical Trends in the Solar PV Market
The impact of nationwide solar capacity on net generation was negligible in 2005,
but with the help of market creation, deployment, and expansion tools, has quickly
become a reasonable investment in addition to providing environmental benefits. In 2005,
annual solar PV installations were a mere 79 megawatts aggregated across residential,
non-residential, and utility scale. In 2013 the United States added 4,751 megawatts of
solar PV, 1,112 of which was non-residential (GTM Research and SEIA, 2014). That
means there was an astounding 5400 percent change in solar PV capacity from 2005 to
2013.
Commercial solar PV dominated the market in early years. From 2000 through
2010, commercial, residential, and utility scale solar PV accounted for 50, 32, and 18
percent, respectively, of total capacity installed. From 2010 through 2013 those numbers
changed to 30, 16, and 54 percent. The 20 percent decrease in commercial market share is
driven by the 36 percent increase in utility scale from 2010 to 2013. One reason for rapid
growth in installations is the precipitous drop of installation costs. The average
installation price per watt in 2005 was roughly $7.70, which is a weighted average of all
sectors. By 2013, the price per watt reached a low of $2.59 because of improved
technology (GTM Research and SEIA, 2014).
One concern of examining the Northeast is that trends over time will differ from
the rest of the country. Each year solar capacity across states outside the study increased
5

on average 73 percent between 2005 and 2013. Solar capacity of states included in the
study over the same period increased by 81 percent per year. If we focus on just the
commercial sector, the average increase in added capacity outside of the study group is
50 percent per year compared to 84 percent per year within the study (The Open PV
Project, 2016). The higher average increase for the study group may be due to states like
New Jersey and Massachusetts adopting aggressive solar policies in recent years.
2.2 Features of Cash Incentives
Several incentives are offered widely across states in the study, and each incentive
has unique features that appeal to administrators and consumers. When consumers
determine whether or not to adopt solar they pay close attention to the availability of
rebates. Rebates are an attractive incentive program for commercial consumers since they
lower upfront costs. Table 1 shows historical adoption of rebates throughout the study.
Table 1: Rebates by Year and State

ᴑ indicates a year where the state offered a rebate

At the beginning of 2005 only three states provided rebates, but by 2013 this number
increased to eight. New Jersey ended their rebate program in 2011, which makes them the
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only state in this study that had a rebate program end during the study period. They are
not, however, the only state to do so in the country. California phased out their state-wide
program by decreasing rebates over time and terminating the program in 2012 (Hughes
and Podolefsky, 2015).
Many rebate programs obtain funding through surcharges on electricity.
Electricity customers pay surcharges per kilowatt hour which provides renewable energy
programs with capital. Between 2005 and 2013, eight of our thirteen states used a
renewable energy surcharge. The charges range from 0.01 cents per kilowatt hour in
Pennsylvania to 0.1 cent per kilowatt hour in Connecticut (Database of State Incentives
for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE), 2016). After a rebate is introduced, the amount
rewarded per kilowatt declines. One reason is that the median prices of installations
between 10 and 100 kilowatts dropped from $8.00 per watt in 2009 to $4.20 in 2013
(Barbose and Dargouth, 2015). Additionally, administrators continue to search for market
expansion tools that do not require use of public funds.
Two policies that have been adopted widely in the commercial solar market are
loan programs and state tax credits. Loan programs began in eight of our ten states in
either 2009 or 2010 because they received their funding from Property Assessed Clean
Energy (PACE) loans. PACE loans are a part of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act and provide funding for a variety of renewable energy projects. The
loans are paid off through increased property taxes over the course of ten to twenty years.
The purpose of PACE loans is to support economic growth while lowering greenhouse
gas emissions (DSIRE, 2016).

7

State tax credits are appealing compared to other tax programs. The sales tax
waiver is a set amount, and the benefit of the incetive increases with the cost of the
installation. States allow the sales tax waiver to be applied to all or just a portion of the
purchase, depending on where parts for the installation come from. The benefit of a sales
tax waiver instead of a property tax credit is that consumers know they will get the full
amount of a sales tax waiver. The property tax credit can be quite large, but if the adopter
does not have high property taxes then they cannot use the whole credit. In addition, the
sales tax waiver cannot exceed the tax rate. This means that the most a sales tax waiver
can reduce upfront costs is by eight percent, which occurs in some counties of New York.
2.3 Features of Non-Financial Incentives
Not all market tools are meant to alleviate upfront costs. There are non-financial
incentives that provide payments over time and others that make installing solar PV
easier for commercial customers. Krasko and Doris (2013) describe three branches of
market tools; preparation, creation, and expansion. Market preparation policies, such as
net metering and interconnection standards, provide signals of a strong market to
potential solar adopters. Market creation tools include RPS mandates and solar carveouts, which are an indication to large investors and solar developers that there will be a
long term market. Lastly, market expansion tools provide consumers with funds so they
can afford to adopt solar PV (Krasko and Doris, 2013).
As installation costs drop rapidly, administrators begin to look for cheaper market
expansion tools. One market tool that could replace a statewide rebate is the Solar
Renewable Energy Credit (SREC) market. SREC markets relieve the need for public
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funding, but prices are volatile which means they do not always send accurate signals to
consumers. The purpose of an SREC market is to provide access for Load Serving
Entities (LSEs) that need to meet requirements (demand) to those with solar capacity
(supply). The LSEs are required to purchase a certain amount of their megawatt hour
generation from renewable or solar sources. If LSEs are short on credits they pay a solar
alternative compliance payment (SACP). The SACP sets a ceiling on the value of each
credit since LSEs can choose to pay for SRECs or the SACP.
Solar Renewable Energy Credit markets exist due to requirements from renewable
portfolio standards (RPS) mandates and solar carve-outs. The solar carve-out can be
thought of as a set-aside from the RPS. A limitation of SREC prices is that sellers into
certain state markets do not have to own capacity in that state. For example, solar
installations in Maryland, West Virginia, Delaware, and the District of Columbia can bid
into the Pennsylvania SREC market. Therefore the prices in the Pennsylvania SREC
market might influence the decision-making of the commercial sector in other states
(Flett Exchange, 2010). Other markets, such as the District of Columbia, have limited
their market to consumers only in their region. Additionally, a seller cannot participate in
both the Pennsylvania and District of Columbia markets.2 Eligibility in multiple markets
will affect the volatility of prices. For example, if there are not enough installations in the
District of Columbia in a given year then the price of an SREC rises drastically. Since
prices and demand are unique to each SREC market, it makes sense to inspect each
market separately instead of aggregating price over the different markets.

2

Determining how many people sell into one market from another region is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Interconnection standards and net metering are two important market creation
tools. Interconnection standards have a different connotation for large-scale and smallscale projects. The standards outline the legal procedure to connect solar PV to the grid,
whether it is a solar farm or rooftop installation. There are typically sections of
interconnection standards that help smaller commercial scale or residential projects
bypass a rigorous screening process (Krasko and Doris, 2013). The size of installations in
this study ranges from 10 kilowatts to 10 megawatts, so both large-scale and small-scale
provisions of interconnection standards are important.
Net metering is the other major market creation tool vital in deployment of the
SREC markets. Net metering standards provide guidelines for compensation once energy
is released into the grid. Some of the standards place limits on the size of projects that are
allowed to use net metering (Krasko and Doris, 2013). One reason for the universal
increase in net metering policies is that as administrators move away from rebates to
other market expansion tools, there needs to be a way for solar PV customers to profit
from excess energy production.

10

CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW
3.1 Impact of RPS Mandates
Many of the incentives and standards discussed above have been studied at length
in the growing literature surrounding renewable energy growth and incentives. Several
studies examine the interaction between RPS mandates and deployment of solar PV.
Carley (2009) explores the impact of RPS mandates on total renewable generation and
the share of renewable electricity generation. RPS mandates require a certain percentage
of energy to be provided by renewables. The data are collected at the state level spanning
the contiguous United States from 1998 to 2006. Carley used a fixed-effects vector
decomposition (FEVD) estimator that allows the user to determine the marginal effects of
time-invariant variables that go unestimated with fixed effects estimators. After
estimating the model with share of renewable electricity generation as the dependent
variable, Carley concluded that RPS mandates are not statistically significant.
Carley estimated a second model using total electricity generation in terms of
MWh as the dependent variable and found a significant effect of RPS mandates. Carley’s
suggestion that RPS mandates do not increase the percentage of total generation but do
increase overall generation means there is an effect for each additional year the mandate
exists, yet mandates fail to achieve their goal of increasing renewable generation as a
percent of the total market. Carley also controlled for tax and cash incentives using two
separate indices in both models and found robust results. Tax incentives have a
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statistically significant negative effect on renewable share and generation, while subsidies
have a positive effect.
A more recent study by Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2011) evaluated whether
RPS mandates or Mandatory Green Power Options (MGPOs) are more effective at
increasing renewable capacity. The dependent variable is total renewable capacity from
650 utilities in the contiguous United States between 1997 and 2007. The authors use a
Heckman two stage model, where the first stage predicts the chance a given state will
adopt RPS mandates or MGPOs. The second stage employs a Tobit estimator using the
predicted value from the first stage to test whether or not polices explain a significant
proportion of renewable capacity (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011).
The expectation is that RPS mandates fail to increase investment from utilities
since there is lax enforcement of RPS mandates. Delmas and Montes-Sancho believe that
MGPOs will be effective at increasing renewable capacity since they create consumer
demand for green power from LSEs. Therefore LSEs have a vested interest in increased
renewable capacity to provide to consumers. They conclude that RPS mandates are not
statistically significant, which supports their hypothesis that the command and control
technique suffers from lack of enforcement. Similar to Carley (2009) the authors create
an index for all other incentives and find that there is not a statistically significant effect
of other incentives on renewable energy capacity.
3.2 Impact of Solar Incentives
Research that is more in line with this study evaluates the impact of different
incentives on solar PV adoption. Some studies examine effects at the state level, while
12

others exploit variation between counties or even different zipcodes. Sarzynski et al.
(2012) explore the impact of cash incentives and different types of tax credits, RPS
mandates, and solar carve-outs on solar PV deployment across the U.S. from 1997
through 2009. The preferred estimator in their paper is fixed-effects which addresses
unobserved heterogeneity. They determine that cash incentives, RPS mandates, and solar
carve-outs are statistically significant, while all of the tax incentives are not. For each
additional year that a cash incentive exists, states with an incentive adopt 23 percent more
PV capacity per year, holding all else constant. States with an RPS mandate adopt on
average 95 percent more capacity than they otherwise would have, holding all else
constant. The largest marginal effect is from solar carve-outs, where a state with the
carve-out adopts 722 percent more capacity on average than without any such policy.
Crago and Chernyakhovskiy (2014) focus on the impact of state level incentives,
environmental preferences, solar resources, and demographic characteristics on added
solar PV capacity at the county level. The study exploits county-year differences in
demographic characteristics and environmental preferences from twelve states in the
Northeast and the District of Columbia between 2005 and 2012. The authors apply an
instrumental variables Tobit (IV Tobit) estimator for two reasons. First, it resolves the
issue of endogeneity due to solar renewable energy credit (SREC) prices. Secondly, it
addresses the non-linear nature of the data caused by a mass point of zero county-year
capacity additions.
Post-estimation results suggest that SREC prices and rebate prices are effective
policy tools. The marginal effect of SREC prices is that a 100 dollar per MWh increase in
price causes a 20 percent increase in solar PV capacity, holding all else constant. The
13

effect of SREC prices is small due to the fact that SREC markets are volatile. Rebates, on
the other hand, are a strong indicator of increased solar PV capacity. Crago and
Chernyakhovskiy (2014) use a binary variable for rebates, which means the marginal
effect is interpreted by whether or not a state provides a rebate. If a state had a rebate
program in a given year, the expected increase in solar PV capacity is 68.5 percent,
holding all else constant (Crago and Chernyakhovskiy, 2014).
Many studies of solar PV occur in California due to the wealth of information
available. A recent study by Hughes and Podolefsky (2015) utilizes variation in rebates
across LSE boundaries to determine the effect of rebate prices on installed residential
solar PV capacity. Data from the California Solar Initiative (CSI) includes tiered
electricity prices between two utility companies in the study: Pacific Gas & Electric
(PG&E) and Southern California Edison (SCE) between 2007 and 2012 at the zipcode
level. The preferred model is a regression discontinuity model restricted to data 20 miles
in either direction of the border between the two utility companies. The authors conclude
that an increase of ten cents from the mean level of $1.46 per watt would cause a 10.1
percent increase in the rate of daily installations, holding all else constant. Not only
would there be a significant impact if the rebate were to increase, but the authors also
determine that if no rebate had existed, there would have been 53 percent fewer
installations (Hughes and Podolefsky, 2015).
3.3 Controls for Environmental Preferences
Another important aspect of the literature examines the impacts of environmental
preferences on renewable energy generation. Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2011) use a
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metric created by the League of Conservation Voters (LCV) that counts the number of
times a representative votes in favor of an environmentally friendly law. This variable is
meant to capture environmental preferences of the state, assuming that there is correlation
between environmental preferences of a district and their congressional member. They
also account for the number of seats held by democratic members in the House of
Representatives and Senate, Sierra Club membership, and democratic governors. They
found that out of all the measures for environmental preferences, the only significant
coefficient across both specifications for RPS mandates and Mandatory Green Power
Options (MGPOs) was democratic members in the House and Senate.
Crago and Chernyakhovskiy (2014) use two different controls in their specification.
First, the authors introduce hybrid vehicle sales by county. The intuition is that
homeowners who purchase hybrid cars may have an environmental agenda, thus are more
likely to purchase solar PV. The second variable is number of democratic votes in the
2008 presidential election. Using an IV Tobit estimator, they conclude that the coefficient
on hybrid vehicles sales is significant, whereas percent of democratic voters is not. The
interpretation for hybrid vehicle sales is that a one percent increase in hybrid vehicle
adoption causes a 12.6 percent increase in solar PV capacity, holding all else constant.
3.4 Measuring Demographics, Energy, and Solar Resources
When determining policy effects on renewable energy adoption, it is imperative to
include variables that control for demographics and solar market factors. Population
density is thought to affect the amount of space consumers have to install solar PV on
their property. In many residential studies, population density is expected to carry a
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negative coefficient. Crago and Chernyakhovskiy (2014) find that a one percent increase
in population density causes a 47.2 percent decrease in solar PV capacity, holding all else
constant. Hitaj (2012) researched the effect of state policies on wind power capacity
across the United States. The author employed a random-effects Tobit (RE Tobit)
estimator which yielded a statistically significant negative coefficient for population
density as well.
There have also been efforts to control for unemployment and income per capita.
Unemployment is a measure for economic health in a county or state. If there are higher
levels of unemployment, it is difficult for consumers to adopt expensive renewable
energy, even if there are incentives. Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2011) employed both
income and unemployment in their model and found that for RPS mandates,
unemployment had a statistically significant and negative effect on firm level renewable
capacity. They also concluded that income has a statistically significant and positive
effect (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011).
Not only is there variation in the demographic makeup of different regions, but also
in natural resource availability. The term solar insolation means the amount of solar
resource available measured in kilowatt-hours per square meter per day, or kWh/m2/day.
I expect that the decision to adopt solar will depend on the amount of the insolation, since
greater solar insolation means higher efficiency for installations with all else equal. Both
Carley (2009) and Crago and Chernyakhovskiy (2014) find significant effects of solar
insolation. Carley’s research states that a one unit increase in solar insolation will cause a
0.005 percent increase in the percentage of renewable energy generation. Crago and
Chernyakhovskiy (2014) found that a one unit increase in solar insolation causes a 118
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percent increase in solar PV capacity, holding all else constant. It is important to note that
the range for solar resource in their study is 0.922 kWh/m2/day so the increase based on
solar insolation cannot be more than 109 percent.
Solar power is a substitute for electricity generated from the grid, allowing the
customer to provide their own energy, or even make money by selling back into the grid.
If the price of electricity increases, then there is more money to gain by producing power
and selling into the grid, and also less money to lose since the owners provide their own
electricity. Hitaj (2012) states that there is a statistically significant and positive
coefficient for electricity price measured in cents per kWh. The resulting marginal effect
is that a one cent per kWh increase in electricity prices causes a 6.4 percent increase in
wind capacity additions, holding all else constant. Sarzynski et al. (2012) found that a one
percent increase in electricity prices causes a two percent increase in the amount of solar
PV capacity installed, holding all else constant.
3.5 Data and Estimation Methods
Regardless of the estimation method, almost every paper discussed above used
panel data to determine the effect of renewable energy policies. Using differences within
regions over time and across regions in a study provides two pieces of insight. Firstly, it
enables the researcher to examine how renewable energy adoption changes over time
based on when incentives are offered during the study. Secondly, it allows for cross
comparison of policies from one region to another.
One issue that frequently arises with panel data is unobserved heterogeneity,
which is a phenomenon captured as an error component in one or more of the explanatory
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variables exclusive of the intercept. Sarzynski et al. (2012) and Carley (2009) address
unobserved heterogeneity with different variations of fixed-effects estimators. Sarzynski
et al. (2012) used Hausman tests to determine that a fixed-effects estimator is preferred to
random effects. In addition to adding indicator variables for states to control for
unobserved heterogeneity, they adopted the Prais-Wintson estimation method to correct
for panel heteroskedasticity (Sarzynski, et al., 2012). Carley (2009) found that a FEVD
estimator is more appropriate for her dataset. The FEVD estimator was introduced by
Plumper and Troeger (2007), and is useful in renewable energy studies because it allows
estimation of coefficients for variables that rarely change over time, such as natural
resource endowment (Carley, 2009).
Another issue that arises in studies of renewable capacity by state or county is the
non-linear nature of the dependent variable. Hitaj begins her discussion of the empirical
strategy by stating that “to get a complete picture of the problem, it is necessary to
include in the sample locations that have not managed to attract wind power investors”
(Hitaj, 2012). If a study only focuses on locations with renewable energy adoption, then it
cannot account for where polices failed to incentivize consumers. Hitaj deployed an RE
Tobit estimator in order to deal with a mass point of zeroes in the data. The author
recognizes that endogeneity of the policy variables could cause the results to be biased
and inconsistent. However, there is no way to deal with random effects and endogeneity
in the context of a Tobit estimator. Therefore an alternative estimator, random effects
instrumental variable ordinary least squares (RE IV OLS), was introduced. Note that the
RE Tobit model is the preferred model in the paper, and that the RE IV OLS is included
as a robustness check.
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Crago and Chernyakhovskiy (2014) approach the issue by comparing two
different types of Tobit estimators. Many authors recognize that there is unobserved
heterogeneity by county. One way to test for this is by using a Breusch-Pagan test, which
the authors test and find a p-value of 0.0000, meaning there is extremely strong evidence
to suggest that a county-specific random effect is present. The first reason the authors
apply an RE Tobit estimator is that according to Wooldridge (2010), the fixed-effects
Tobit (FE Tobit) estimator is biased and inconsistent. Secondly, the fact that their panel is
short limits the degrees of freedom available in a fixed-effects model, which was also
mentioned in Hitaj (2012). The second and preferred Tobit estimator is the IV Tobit
procedure. The authors argue that SREC prices are endogenous since unobserved market
conditions and effects are correlated with the amount of solar PV installed and prices in
SREC markets. The two instruments used to address endogeneity are lagged SREC prices
and SACPs. Based on the Wald test of exogeneity, SREC prices were endogenous,
meaning the IV Tobit estimator is needed to address the issue (Crago and
Chernyakhovskiy, 2014).
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CHAPTER 4
DATA
4.1 Trends in Solar PV Capacity
The first step in evaluating solar PV capacity starts with collection of reliable data
on solar PV installations. The Open PV Project provides a dataset of all solar PV
installations in the United States. This is an important process since multiple groups
collect data within each state. The original dataset for the Northeastern states and District
of Columbia contains 9284 solar PV installations which are all greater than 10 kilowatts.
The 10 kilowatt cutoff has been used in previous studies to differentiate between
commercial and residential projects (Crago and Chernyakhovskiy, 2014; Kwan, 2012).
The location of each project is defined by zipcode, which is aggregated to the county
level. Aggregation is done using a zipcode-to-county crosswalk file from the Missouri
Data Center. A crosswalk file matches each zipcode in the Open PV dataset to a city
using an allocation factor. The allocation factor is based on geographic area, where 100
percent means there is only one city in that zipcode. Whatever city had the largest
allocation factor in a given zipcode was awarded the installations (Missouri Census Data
Center, 2016). This is a necessary process because zipcodes do not conform to city or
even county boundaries. I only keep the city with the greatest allocation factor for any
given zipcode. For example, there are three cities in West Virginia which have the
zipcode 24701: Bluefield, Bluewell, Green Valley. Based on the allocation factor of
0.334 I assign all installations that might exist in the zipcode 24701 to Bluefield, West
Virginia.
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Once this process is finished I merged the zipcodes in order to match installations
to a particular county. During this process, there were 95 solar installations that did not
have a zipcode reported in the Missouri Census Data Center File. I looked up each of the
zipcodes and matched 89 of them to a county. The other six observations contained
zipcodes that were unable to be found using the United States Postal Service zipcode
finder; therefore I dropped them from the dataset. This means that the resulting number
of observed installations is 9279. Open PV provides an “install type” identifier for each
installation. The five installation types I considered were commercial, nonprofit,
nonresidential, public, and unknown. I excluded observations identified as residential,
government, or utility installations since they utilized a different set of subsidies. The
initial range of the data was from 10 kilowatts to nearly 20 megawatts. I assumed that any
of the installations over 10 megawatts were utility scale projects. With this assumption, I
dropped five installations; the final dataset contains 9274 observations from ten kilowatts
to 10 megawatts.
It is also helpful to explore trends by state and over time. The final data I use from
Open PV reports that roughly 1.55 gigawatts of capacity was installed across the
Northeastern states and District of Columbia from 2005 to 2013. Figure 1 shows that
New Jersey and Massachusetts are leaders in installed capacity based on total kilowatts.
New Jersey installed nearly one gigawatt and Massachusetts installed roughly 260
megawatts over the study period. Other than Pennsylvania with 111 megawatts installed,
every other state is below 100 megawatts from 2005 through 2013.
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Figure 1: Total Megawatt Capacity Added by State from 2005 through 2013
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States with more businesses, such as New Jersey and Massachusetts, have more
commercial customers who can adopt solar PV. To address the issue of market size, I
weight each observation by the number of businesses with more than 10 employees.
Figure 2 shows the ranking of kilowatt per business by state.
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Figure 2: Weighted Total Capacity Added by State from 2005 through 2013
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New Jersey and Massachusetts are still at the top of the list, with 0.3 and 0.1 kilowatts per
business. Connecticut and Delaware install more kilowatts per business out of the other
Northeastern states, even though before they ranked fifth and seventh in total kilowatts
(See Figure 1). New York added the fourth most solar PV capacity over the course of our
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study, but ranked eighth when weighted by number of businesses. These results suggest
that controlling for market size is an important step in model specification.
The time dimension of the panel allows us to examine aggregated trends across
the Northeastern states and the District of Columbia. Figure 3 shows that the largest
single year gain in kilowatt capacity occurred in 2012, where approximately 546
megawatts entered the solar PV market. By comparison, the amount of solar PV capacity
added in 2005 was 4.4 megawatts. After seven years of continued growth, there is a
significant decrease in newly added capacity from 2012 to 2013. A report by Barbose and
Darghouth (2015) confirms that there was a nation-wide decrease in commercial solar PV
from 2012 to 2013, but not in the other markets.3
Figure 3: Megawatts Added by Year, All States
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There is conflict in measuring commercial solar PV capacity between the SEIA report and the
Open PV database. The SEIA report suggests that there is an increase in added commercial PV capacity of
3.7 percent from 2012 to 2013. This is by far the smallest increase in the commercial sector since 2000, but
is still a positive increase in added capacity (GTM Research and SEIA, 2014). My study utilizes data from
the Open PV Project, which states that there is a 40 percent decrease in added capacity between 2012 and
2013. Other authors such as Barbose and Darghouth (2015) use the Open PV Project for a solar PV market
outlook; therefore I feel comfortable with the accuracy of the Open PV Project’s database.
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4.2 Dependent Variable
The 9274 observed values of solar PV installations are identified by their month,
day, and year year of installation in a given county. I aggregate installations across 300
counties with installations tracked over nine years, which means there are 2700 values for
installed solar PV capacity. The panel is balanced since there are nine observations for
each year in each county. The mean value, 1591 kW, is much larger than the median
number of kilowatts, 193, which suggests that the data are right skewed (Figure 4).
Figure 4: Histogram of added capacity by county and year

2000

Frequency of Added Capacity

1800
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 64 68 72 76

Added Solar Capacity in Megwatts by County and Year

The mass point of zero-added capacity values is one reason that the data are right
skewed. There are 1789 observed county-year combinations with zero added solar PV
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capacity, which is 66 percent of the total observations. Within those 1789 observations,
eighty counties did not have a single year with a solar PV installation. Fifty-two of these
counties are in West Virginia. When there is a mass point of zeros in a dataset, it is called
a corner solution response. A formal definition by Wooldridge (2010) states that a corner
solution response as a situation where the “nonegative response variable has a (roughly)
continuous distribution over strictly positive values, but 𝑃(𝑦 = 0) > 0” (Wooldridge,
2010, 667). This means zero is a value which the dependent variable takes due to the
restriction that there cannot be negative solar capacity growth. The probability of an
observation being at the corner is greater than zero, which cannot occur in a continuous
function. Later I will discuss the consequence of choosing an estimator due to the corner
solution.
4.3 Measures of Incentive Programs
There are several groups of explanatory variables in the final specification
including incentives, instruments, and controls. Incentives are variables of primary
interest since I want to determine whether or not they have an effect on solar PV capacity
additions in the Northeast. A large amount of incentive data is collected from the
Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE, 2016) which is used
in many papers, while other variables required collection from multiple sources. DSIRE
has an expansive list of polices from each state including the type of policy, start date,
applicable sectors, and background information. I determined the start date of each policy
and created a binary variable for whether or not a policy existed for each county-year
combination in the study. Incentives which are represented with binary variables at the
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state and year level include net metering, interconnection, loans, and performance-based
incentives.
Other incentive programs are measured using specific amounts. The sales tax
incentive is measured at the level of the state tax rate, with several states increasing the
rate during our study period. All of the states in our study have a single tax rate except for
New York. New York has a four percent state tax, and then individual counties have their
own tax rate. There is variation within county, meaning the sales tax variable will vary by
county and year. I include an RPS trend value which was first used by Menz and Vachon
(2006). After a state implements an RPS, each additional year increases the value of RPS
trend by one.
Alternative specifications for net metering and interconnections standards
originate from Freeing the Grid. Freeing the Grid is a group that reports grades for each
state’s interconnection and net metering polices. The reports start in 2007, with five
possible grades. The highest grade is an A, and an F is the lowest (Freeing the Grid,
2016). Interconnection grades were low across our area of study in 2007. Every state
other than New Jersey was ranked at a C or below. By 2013, all states other than New
Hampshire are ranked at a B or higher. Net metering policies continue to improve as time
progresses. In 2007 there were eight states ranked below a C. By 2013, every single state
had net metering standards with a grade of B or higher.
In the main specification I evaluate rebate rates and SREC markets with average
price by year and state. Utilizing dollar per kilowatt rebate rate information provides a
transparent identification of the amount states spend on decreasing upfront costs. Rebate
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data for the states of Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, and Vermont were obtained from Sam Dauphanais.4 I pared the data down to
commercial installations and found a yearly average of dollar-per-kilowatt rebate
amounts. There are three regions for which I could not find detailed commercial rebate
data: New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and the District of Columbia. To address this issue
for these regions I first calculated the average size of an installation by year using the
Open PV data. Then I used information about the rebate structure based on the size of the
installation, and calculated how much the average rebate would have been based on
average installation size in a given year.
In Figure 5 it is apparent that average rebate amount per kilowatt offered
decreases over time after peaking in 2008. The average rebate in 2005 was $1.63 per
kilowatt, reached its highest value at $2.12 in 2008, and fell to an average of $0.88 in
2013. Rebate amounts could decline due to the rise of other market tools such as SREC
markets, as well as decreasing solar panel prices which reduces the need for upfront
subsidies.

Dollars per Kilowatt

Figure 5: Rebate by Year in dollars per kilowatt
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Sam Dauphanais is a graduate student in the Department of Resource Economics at the University of
Massachusetts Amherst.
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The SREC markets exist due to a requirement that LSEs provide a certain amount
of generation from renewable resources. Two of the leading traders for SREC markets are
SRECtrade and Flett Exchange. I collected data from Flett Exchange which is accessible
to the public, whereas SRECtrade requires purchasing the data in order to gain access.
Both sources have different average prices for each year and state since they handle
different trades. In order to gauge the accuracy of the data, I compared average prices by
market with the SRECtrade prices used in Chernyakhovskiy and Crago (2014). The
correlation coefficient between prices for the two sets of observations is 0.868, which is a
good indication that my data are accurate.
SREC market prices are measured as an average yearly market price in each
market. The unit of an SREC is dollars per one megawatt-hour of electricity, and has a
value that changes based on market conditions (Flett Exchange, 2016). The earliest SREC
market began in 2007 in New Jersey, with an average credit price of $182. The largest
average yearly price was $668 per credit in the 2008 New Jersey market. The smallest
non-zero price occurred in 2013, at $11.41 per credit in Pennsylvania. Recall that eight
other states are allowed to enter solar capacity into the Pennsylvania market, which can
lead to market saturation and lower prices (Flett Exchange, 2010). A common theme
among SREC markets is high price at inception of the market. Figure 6 shows that over
time prices begin to fall in all markets except for Massachusetts and the District of
Columbia.
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Figure 6: SREC Prices by State from 2005 through 2013

According to Flett Exchange, the Massachusetts SREC price fell to zero dollars in
2012 and increased to 72 dollars per credit in 2013. The data collected by Crago and
Chernyakhovskiy (2014) reports a SREC credit price of $326.33 in 2012, which suggests
that there is a decrease from 2012 to 2013. Even though the correlation between
SRECtrade and Flett Exchange data is high, it is necessary to point out the discrepancy
between the two.
The District of Columbia SREC credit prices continue to rise from 2011 to 2013.
There are three factors that cause SREC prices to grow. First, the law requires that credits
originate from the District of Columbia which is a geographically constrained area.
Second, solar capacity required to meet the solar carve-out increases year after year. If
there are not enough solar PV installations to meet demand, price increases each year.
Lastly, the price ceiling defined by SACPs is set at 500 dollars until 2017 (DSIRE, 2016).
Therefore, LSEs will pay any price below 500 dollars for a credit to meet their required
solar generation.
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4.4 Controls for Solar PV Capacity
The final set of variables is controls, which can be broken down into market
factors, demographic characteristics, and environmental preferences. The three market
factors in this study are commercial electricity prices, solar insolation, and number of
businesses. Commercial electricity prices, which originate from the Energy Industry
Administration (EIA), vary by state and year. I chose to use wholesale commercial prices
because they are representative of rates relevant to consumers in our study. Each
observed electricity price is the nominal cost in cents per kilowatt of commercial
electricity in a given state by year. Solar insolation is collected from the National
Renewables Energy Laboratory (NREL), and varies at the county level in this study.
Solar insolation measures how many kilowatt-hours per square meter per day
(kWh/m2/day) each county averages. It is important to control for solar resources since
there is some variation among counties, albeit small relative to variation nationally. In
this study solar insolation varies between 4.084 kWh/m2/day and 5.007 kWh/m2/day.
Lastly, it is important to control for the number of businesses in each county by year
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2016a). Only businesses with more than 10 employees are
considered, with the assumption that smaller businesses do not have the infrastructure to
install solar PV capacity.
Demographic characteristics are important to address in any study that spans
different geographic areas. The demographic characteristics for which I control include
population density, income, and unemployment. Population density is a combination of
population data from the American Community Survey (ACS) and land area data from
the Census Tiger/Line database (U.S. Census Bureau, 2016b). The population data varies
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by year and county, whereas land area is constant over time by county. I then divide
population by area to create a population density variable that measures population per
square mile for each county-year combination. Income data, which is a proxy for wealth
of the county, came from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA, 2016). Even though
solar PV adopters in this study are commercial entities and not homeowners, income in
each county is representative of salaries provided which is an input of individual firms.
The income variable varies by both county and year which is important since our study
period covers the recent recession. Unemployment data are provided by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS, 2016). Unemployment varies by county and year and is measured
between zero and one hundred percent. In lieu of using county GDP, unemployment acts
as a measurement for the health of each county’s economy.
Environmental preferences are meant to account for whether or not people in a
certain county support pro-environmental actions. One measure of pro-environmental
preferences is historical voting data, which I have measured in votes for congressional
leaders, specifically the House of Representatives. The variable of interest is percent of
voters who voted for the democratic candidate, and is provided by the Federal Election
Committee (FEC, 2016). Since representatives are voted for every other year, I
interpolated the value for odd numbered years. Therefore the number of votes cast for
democratic representatives varies by state and year. In addition to measuring the number
of votes for each party in congressional races, I can use a measure of voting by congress
created by the League of Conservation Voters (LCV). The LCV creates a score for each
state in each year, except for the District of Columbia. Each state is assigned a score
based on the number of pro-environmental ballots cast divided by the total number of
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environmental votes (LCV, 2016). Each score is measured as a percentage and varies by
state and year. The LCV data and the democratic voting data can be used together since
one measures how the populace voted and the other measures congressional voting
record. A detailed summary of each variable is provided in Table 2 below.
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables
Varies
By*

Max

Min

Median

Mean

Standard
Deviation

C,Y

75716

10

193

1591

4867

Net Metering (Yes=1)

S,Y

1

0

1

0.91

0.28

Interconnection (Yes=1)

S,Y

1

0

1

0.80

0.40

Net Metering (scale)

S,Y

5

0

4

3.32

2.03

Interconnection (scale)

S,Y

5

0

4

2.71

1.71

Loan (Yes=1)
Performance-Based
(Yes=1)

S,Y

1

0

0

0.46

0.50

S,Y

1

0

0

0.12

0.32

Sales Tax Rate (percent)

S,Y

7

0

0

1.69

2.74

Rebate (dollars/kw/year)

S,Y

4.88

0

0.36

1.10

1.49

SREC (dollars/mWh/year)

S,Y

668

0

0

51

128.17

RPS Trend (number of years)

S,Y

11

0

2

2.89

2.86

SACP (dollars/mWh/year)

S,Y

711

0

0

104

209.33

RPS (percent)

S,Y

10

0

1.99

2.41

0.02

Carveout (percent)

S,Y

0.598

0

0.003

0.03

0.001

Electricity Price (cents/kWh)

C,Y

17.11

5.53

11.61

11.55

3.23

Insolation (kWh/m2/day)

C

5.01

4.08

4.47

4.48

0.20

Number of Businesses
Population
Density
(population/m2)

C,Y

166050

42

2805

8592

15115

C,Y

72006

2.77

140

1138

5304

Income (dollars)

C,Y

121632

17275

36037

38348

11528

Unemployment (percent)

C,Y

17.10

2

7

6.77

2.21

LCV Senators (percent)

S,Y

100

0

82

76.39

23.0

72

68.27

22.15

56.35

56.61

0.09

Variable
Dependent Variable
Added Capacity (kw)
Solar Market Policies

Incentive

Instruments**

Controls

LCV House (percent)
S,Y
100
19
Percent Democratic voters
(percent)
S,Y
97.34
30.16
*S denotes state, C denotes county, and Y denotes year
**The instruments will be discussed in detail in 6.3
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CHAPTER 5
METHODOLOGY
5.1 Empirical Model Specification
I must determine what motivates a commercial consumer to adopt solar PV before
I lay out an empirical model. Without installing solar PV, commercial customers will
have to pay for electricity to operate their business. Thus, the potential solar adopter must
weigh the options of installing solar PV to generate energy or relying on LSEs. To
estimate how much electricity the solar PV installation can replace, I must include the
amount of solar insolation; this is an important determinant of efficiency (Crago and
Chernyakhovskiy, 2014). Additionally, standards such as net metering allow commercial
adopters to sell excess energy to LSEs, so adopting net metering legislation is expected to
increase solar PV adoption.
A barrier to solar PV installation is high upfront costs. Many programs, such as
loans, rebates, and sales tax waivers alleviate upfront payments. If programs that decrease
upfront costs increase in size, then barriers to adopting solar fall and more commercial
consumers will adopt solar PV. Other programs such as SREC markets and performancebased incentives provide a payback for the investment in solar PV over time. As the
payment from either program increases, commercial solar PV adopters can expect higher
returns over time on their investment.
I account for time because it is important to control for the decline of installation
costs, third party ownership, and preferences for solar PV. Additionally, environmental
preferences may explain consumer preferences for renewable energy and other
environmentally responsible goods (Crago and Chernyakhovskiy, 2014). The only
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environmental preference I include in this specification is democratic voting percentage.
The full specification I test is:
ln(𝑌𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝛼0 + β1 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝜃2 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡 + 𝑓(𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠)
+ 𝑔(𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠) + ℎ(𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠) + 𝜇𝑖𝑡
where year is t = 1,2, …, 9, county is i = 1,2,…, 300, state is s = 1,2,…,13, Yit is solar
added capacity by county and year, Timet is the year of the solar capacity additions, and
Democratsst is the percent of democratic voters by state and year. Also, α0 , β1 ,
and θ2 are coefficients to be estimated. Lastly, the error term is distributed normally with
a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 𝜎 2 . The distribution is also independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d).
Each variable is expected to impact solar PV capacity in some manner. The
different effects are captured by the sign of the estimated coefficients. I expect a positive
coefficient for time trend. The decline of solar PV installation costs, increases in third
party installations, and changes in preferences for solar PV are captured by the time trend
variable. Over time I expect more commercial consumers to adopt solar PV. The only
environmental preference in the main specification is percent of democratic voters. As
the percent of democrats increases by county, I expect consumers to have stronger
environmental preferences. Therefore, I expect a positive coefficient for percent of
democratic voters (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011).
Furthermore, it is also important to control for demographic characteristics.
Population density has been used in residential solar PV studies (Kwan, 2012). Income is
a proxy for how well businesses are doing in a given county. Lastly, unemployment
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controls for the strength of each county’s economy. The three demographic controls are
defined as:
𝑓(𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠) = λ3 ln(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 ) + λ4 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + λ5 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡
where PopDensit is population density for each county in a given year, Incomeit is the
average annual income per person by county and year, and Unemploymentit is the percent
of unemployed workers by county and year. Finally, 𝜆3 , 𝜆4 , and 𝜆5 are coefficients to be
estimated.
The demographic controls capture differences among counties and over time. The
first demographic control is population density. I took the natural log of population
density because the distribution of the data was right skewed. When there is more
residential construction, there is less room for large commercial solar projects. Therefore,
I expect a negative coefficient for population density. The second demographic control is
income. I expect a positive coefficient, since increases in income act as a proxy for the
wealth of companies. Wealthier companies have funds to invest in a long term project
like solar PV. The last demographic variable is unemployment. I included unemployment
to measure the strength of each county’s economy. The coefficient for unemployment
should be negative. An increase in unemployment means that companies are eliminating
workers, and other companies cannot provide them with jobs. If companies cannot find
funds to hire employable workers, then it is unlikely they can adopt solar PV.
There are also four solar market factors in the specification. Each variable affects
the solar market differently. The number of businesses defines the size of the market.
Solar insolation is a large determinant of how productive a solar installation will be over
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its lifetime. Lastly, solar PV is a substitute for electricity from the grid. Therefore, the
price of a substitute will affect solar PV capacity. The variables enter the model as:
𝑔(𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠)
= γ6 ln(𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 ) + γ7 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + γ8 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑡
+ γ8 CountInstallations𝑖𝑡−1
where Businessesit is the number of businesses by county and year, Insolationi measures
the amount of solar insolation by county, Electricityst measures the price of commercial
electricity by state and year, and lastly CountInstallationsit-1 measures the number of
commercial installations from the previous year. The coefficients to be estimated for
solar market factors are γ6 , γ7 , γ8 , γ9 .
Solar market factors are variables that affect the decision making process for
commercial consumers. The first solar market factor is number of businesses, and like
population density I took the natural log because the distribution of the data is skewed to
the right. The number of businesses represents the size of the commercial market. With a
larger market, there is greater opportunity for solar PV growth; therefore I expect a
positive coefficient. Solar insolation measures solar generation potential by county.
Business owners in counties with more solar generation potential will be more likely to
adopt solar PV since the return on their investment is greater. Therefore, I expect a
positive coefficient for solar insolation. Solar PV is a substitute for electricity from the
grid. Therefore, as the price of electricity increases, commercial consumers gain more
benefit from reduced energy use. Thus I expect a positive coefficient for energy prices.
Lastly, I expect that greater change in number of installations will spur potential
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customers to adopt. Therefore, I expect the coefficient for change in solar PV
installations to be positive.
Finally, the variables of interest are solar market incentives. There are eight
incentives of interest. Previous literature has highlighted the impact of rebates and RPS
individually, while the other variables have been studied as a suite of incentive programs.
The incentives I include are:
ℎ(𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠)
= δ10 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡 + δ11 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 + δ12 𝑃𝐵𝐼𝑠𝑡 + δ13 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑡
+ δ14 𝑅𝑃𝑆𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡 + δ15 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑠𝑡 + δ16 𝑅𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 + δ17 𝑆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑠𝑡
where all of the incentives vary by state and year except for the sales tax waiver. The
variable NetMeteringst is an indicator variable for met metering, Interconnectionst is an
indicator variable for interconnection standards, PBIst is an indicator for performancebased incentives, and Loanst is an indicator variable for existence of a loan program.
There are several continuous variables, including RPSTrendst which represents the length
of an active RPS program, SalesTaxst is the percent of the sales tax waiver which varies
by county and year, Rebatest represents the average rebate amount, and SRECst is the
average annual SREC price by state market. Lastly, δ10 , δ11 , δ12 , δ13 , δ14 , δ15 , δ16 ,
and δ17 are coefficients to be estimated.
I expect that every coefficient for a solar market incentive will be positive, and
the reasons for their expected effect vary. Net metering standards provide legal rights for
solar PV customers to be compensated for energy fed back into the grid. Active net
metering standards should provide more certainty that solar PV customers are protected
through law to profit from unused energy that flows into the gird (Sarzysnki et al., 2012).
Interconnection standards also send positive signals to solar PV customers that their
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rights are protected. Therefore, a state with interconnection standards is expected to have
more solar PV capacity. Loan programs allow solar PV adopters to pay back the high
upfront costs with low interest rates. An example is the PACE loan program, which
collects the principal of the loan through increased property taxes. When low interest
loans are introduced, I expect consumers previously hindered by high upfront costs will
consider adoption.
The values of RPS trend represent how long the RPS has been active in each state.
The longer an RPS is active, the more experience participants have with meeting required
renewable generation. This means that RPS standards which have been around for longer
periods of time will spur more solar PV capacity. The sales tax waiver allows the
consumer to forgo paying a percent tax on their solar PV purchase. As the sales tax
increases I expect more solar PV capacity to be adopted. Rebates provide customers with
a dollar per kilowatt refund on their investment. This alleviates upfront costs; therefore I
expect higher rebates to lead to more solar PV capacity. Lastly, an increase in SREC
prices indicates that solar generation is more valuable to LSEs. As the percent of solar
generation requirements increases, demand will increase also. After a shift in demand and
increased prices, I expect an increase in solar PV capacity which is the supply of credits.
5.2 Using Natural Log of Solar Capacity
There are 2700 total observations represented by 300 counties over nine years. I
take the natural log of the dependent variable before estimating the impact of incentives
on added solar capacity for two reasons. First, it is important that values outside of the
mass point of zeroes be normally distributed (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010,545). When
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added capacity is aggregated at the county-year level, the data are extremely right skewed
(Figure 7).
Figure 7: Histogram of Solar Capacity by County and Year from 2005 through 2013
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Taking the natural log of skewed data is one method to address the non-normal
nature. As Figure 8 shows, taking the natural log makes the dependent variable less
skewed. However, even the data in Figure 8 are right skewed: the median is 5.26 and the
mean is 5.43. Although the data are not perfectly normal, I chose to use the natural log of
solar capacity as the form of the dependent variable.
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Figure 8: Histogram of Log Solar Capacity
by County and Year from 2005 through 2013
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Since the natural log of zero is undefined, the 66 percent of observations at the
corner are undefined. Cameron and Trivedi (2010, 546) suggest that the researcher define
the comer solution values as:
0 + Ϫ,

𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 Ϫ = 0.0001

This provides a real value for the corner solution while addressing the skewed continuous
distribution of solar capacity.
5.3 Choice of Estimator
The dependent variable, as I mentioned in the data section, has a corner solution
at zero. This means that the added solar PV capacity by county and year is a limited
dependent variable since it cannot take on a negative value. One estimator I can choose to
determine the effect of the independent variables on solar PV capacity is Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS). An issue with OLS is that predicted values can be less than zero which is
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not a possible outcome for added solar PV capacity. OLS provides unreasonable
predictions due to the assumption that the marginal effect is constant for all values of the
independent variables. Another option is to ignore observations at the corner solution and
focus only on values greater than zero. However, this causes selection bias. Therefore, I
will not consider OLS, and instead appeal to estimators that use maximum likelihood
estimation (MLE) (Hill et al., 2008).5
The purpose of MLE is to estimate coefficients that maximize the likelihood of
observing values for the sample of 2700 county-year observations. Probit and logit
estimators are not applicable for data with a continuous distribution. While this is not an
issue for the 66 percent of data at the mass point zero, values greater than zero take on a
continuous distribution. The Tobit estimator addresses the fact that solar PV capacity is a
corner solution outcome. Every value for solar PV capacity is observed, and there is a
corner solution at zero. This does not mean that 66 percent of observations were missing
and given a value of zero, but that there was no added capacity observed for that county
in a given year (Wooldridge, 2010, 667). The representation of solar PV capacity by
county and year is:
𝑌 ∗ , 𝑖𝑓 𝑌𝑖 ≥ 0
𝑌𝑖 { 𝑖
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
The Tobit estimator is equipped to deal with the mass point of zeroes with maximum
likelihood meaning that none of our predicted values will be negative. Additionally, it
does not restrict the continuous nature of the data to a value of one as does logit or probit.
For these reasons, I use Tobit to estimate the model.
5

Appendix A provides a discussion of the best linear estimator, if one were to be used.
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5.4 Tobit Estimator
The Tobit model is given by:
𝑌𝑖∗ = 𝛽0 + 𝒙𝜷 + 𝝁 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝝁|𝒙 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎 2 ) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑌𝑖 = max(0, 𝑌𝑖∗ )
This means that the observed value of added solar capacity is either a positive value
which satisfies classical linear assumptions, or it is zero. The Tobit model also suggests
that the error term is distributed normally with a mean of zero and variance 𝜎 2 . The Tobit
model uses the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) to estimate coefficients. The log
likelihood function for each observation is:

𝑙𝑖 (𝜷, 𝜎) = 1(𝑌𝑖 = 0) log [1 − 𝛷 (

(𝑌𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 𝜷)
𝑥𝑖 𝜷
1
)] + 1(𝑌𝑖 > 0) log {( ) 𝜙 [
]}
𝜎
𝜎
𝜎

where li (β, σ) is the likelihood estimator as a function of the coefficients β and the
standard deviation σ, Φ represents the standard normal cumulative density function, and
ϕ represents the standard normal density function.
There are two important components to the likelihood estimator that address the
corner solution of zero. The first portion of the estimator is used with observations that
are at the corner solution, 𝑌𝑖 = 0. The second portion of the estimator is called upon
when the observation is a positive value, or 𝑌𝑖 > 0. The fact that the likelihood estimator
can utilize both possibilities is why the Tobit estimator is preferred.
The conditional and unconditional expectations from the Tobit model provide
insight as to why linear methods are inconsistent or biased. The conditional expectation is
aptly named for the condition that 𝑌𝑖 > 0 are the values of interest. The conditional
expectation is:
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𝜙(𝒙𝜷/𝜎)
𝐸(𝑌𝑖 |𝑌𝑖 > 0, 𝒙) = 𝒙𝜷 + 𝜎𝜆 (
)
Φ(𝒙𝜷/𝜎)
𝜙(𝒙𝜷/𝜎)

The additional term, 𝜎𝜆 (Φ(𝒙𝜷/𝜎)), is called the inverse Mills ratio. This is an important
component of the Tobit specification, and is why Tobit is the preferred estimator. The
inverse Mills ratio is positive because each individual term is positive. If I were to use
OLS to estimate the conditional expectation, I would be ignoring the effect of the inverse
Mills ratio. This is a form of omitted variables bias, which supports the choice of the
Tobit estimator for data with a corner solution.
I am mainly interested in the unconditional expectation since it provides insight
into the entire dataset, and not just observations with positive values. The unconditional
expectation is:
𝒙𝜷
𝒙𝜷
𝐸[𝑦|𝒙] = Φ ( ) 𝒙𝜷 + 𝜎𝜙 ( )
σ
σ
The expectation of the dependent variable is a nonlinear function of both the independent
variables and coefficients. Therefore, any estimation done with linear methods provides
biased estimates. Additionally, the unconditional expectation is always positive for any
combination of 𝒙 and 𝜷. This is a significant claim because it means that, unlike OLS
predictions, there can be no negative predicted values.
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CHAPTER 6
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
First I estimate the model using a pooled Tobit estimator, and then testing whether
or not each group of variables is significant using a likelihood ratio test. Next, I deal with
issues regarding possible violation of assumptions about the error term. I then consider
that SREC prices are potentially endogenous. I utilize an IV Tobit estimator to attempt to
find estimates that are consistent. Following the IV Tobit estimator I address unobserved
heterogeneity with the RE Tobit estimator. Finally, I provide alternative specifications for
comparison to the preferred RE Tobit coefficients.
6.1 Pooled Tobit Estimator
The Tobit estimator discussed in section 5.4 accounts only for the cross-section
dimension, denoted by i. Since this is a panel data set with 300 counties over nine years, I
must specify a pooled Tobit estimator. The idea is to treat all 300 cross-sections over all
nine years in a more general, pooled framework. This general pooled Tobit model is
written as
𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∗ = 𝛽0 + 𝒙𝒊𝒕 𝜷 + 𝝁𝒊𝒕
where year is t=1,2,…, 9, county is i=1,2,..., 300, 𝝁𝒊𝒕 |𝒙𝒊𝒕 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎 2 ), and 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =
max(0, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∗ ).
I implement the estimator using the general Tobit estimation process by treating
the panel as a cross section of 2700 observations. The variables of interest are laid out in
the empirical model section, but have yet to be tested. I started by estimating the full
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model specification. Then, I systematically test for what groups of variables are
statistically significant. The process involves estimating the full model and a model that
excludes the variable or group of variables I want to test. I determine whether or not the
variable(s) I exclude explain a statistically significant amount of added solar capacity. In
order to test statistical significance I use a likelihood ratio test (LR test). The test
measures the difference between the two likelihoods, where the model with the restriction
has a smaller or equal log-likelihood compared to the unrestricted model. The statistic is
distributed 𝜒 2 with degrees of freedom equal to the difference in parameters between the
restricted and unrestricted model. The test statistic is:
𝐿𝑅 = −2 [ln (ℒ(𝜃̂𝑟 )) − n (ℒ(𝜃̂𝑢 ))]
where ℒ(𝜃̂𝑟 ) is the estimated log-likelihood of the restricted model and ℒ(𝜃̂𝑢 ) is the
estimated log-likelihood of the unrestricted model. The null hypothesis is that the
coefficients of the excluded variables are zero, while the alternative is that at least one of
the coefficients is significant.
The systematic process is to exclude each group of variables one at a time, and
then run an LR test on the restriction. I carry this process out for the time trend variable,
democratic voting percentage as a proxy for environmental preferences, demographics,
solar market factors, and incentives. Every p-value except for the LR test of democratic
voting percentage is significant at the one percent level, meaning that at least one variable
in each group explains a significant portion of added solar capacity. The p-value of the
LR test for democratic voting percentage is 0.5002, thus I fail to reject that the coefficient
is different from zero. In the final estimation I exclude percent of democratic voters as an
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explanatory variable. I ran the pooled Tobit estimator and the resulting coefficients and
clustered standard errors are reported in column 2 of Table 3. I cluster the standard errors
because inferential statistics using regular standard errors are inflated. Since there is
correlation between solar PV capacity within cross-section, I need to cluster the standard
errors by county. I explain this process in more detail in section 6.2.
Table 3: Coefficients from Pooled Tobit Estimator

Variables
Time Trend
Electricity Price
Count of PV Installations t-1
Insolation
ln(Businesses)
ln(Population Density)
Income
Unemployment
Rebate
Loan
Sales Tax Waiver
SREC Prices
Performance-Based Incentives
Net Metering
Interconnection
RPS Trend
Constant
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***
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Pooled Tobit Coefficient with
Clustered Standard Errors
1.995***
(0.299)
0.736***
(0.195)
0.06***
(0.024)
8.848***
(2.716)
4.336***
(0.599)
-0.918**
(0.433)
0
(0.0000)
-0.051
(0.182)
2.694***
(0.361)
3.674***
(1.051)
1.067***
(0.150)
0.008***
(0.002)
2.033*
(1.104)
8.083***
(2.678)
-1.675
(1.470)
0.644***
(0.206)
-116.282***
(13.699)

All incentives except for interconnection standards are significant at the ten
percent level. The negative coefficient for interconnection standards is unexpected, but of
little concern for interpretation since it is insignificant. The demographic controls have
varying degrees of significance. When I used the LR test to test the restriction of
excluding demographic controls, I found a p-value of 0.008, suggesting that they explain
a significant portion of the variability in the model. However, the only demographic
control with a significant effect is population density. Lastly, all of the solar market
factors are significant at the five percent level.
6.2 Violation of Error Assumptions
In addition to assuming a normally distributed error term, the Tobit model relies
heavily on the assumption that the errors are independent. If I incorrectly assume
independence, the standard errors will be inflated which clouds any inferences I make. I
expect that there is a relationship between the amount a county adopts from one year to
the next. One reason for this is that in some states, there are additional loan programs that
I do not account for which vary by municipality. This means that local governments can
choose whether or not to offer loan programs. Additionally, certain counties may have
LSEs that offer their own solar incentives. The presence of other programs may cause
certain counties to have consistently higher adoption rates throughout the study.
Similarly, counties without any programs may have no adoption at all. For example, there
are 80 counties which had zero solar capacity added over the course of nine years.
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In panel data, intra-class correlation (ICC) within each cross section is common.
The ICC is calculated using information of variance between counties and within
counties. The ICC is equal to:
𝜎 2 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛
𝐼𝐶𝐶 = 2
𝜎 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 + 𝜎 2 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛
where 𝜎 2 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 is the pooled variance between counties and 𝜎 2 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 is the pooled
variance within counties.
The ICC between counties in the study is 0.414, which is a relatively strong
indicator that errors terms are not independent. I can cluster the standard errors to combat
non-independent errors. For simplicity consider that there is just one scalar regressor. The
clustered standard error is equal to:

̅ − 1)
𝑆𝐸𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 = 𝑆𝐸 ∗ √1 + 𝑝𝑥 𝑝𝑒 (𝑁
̅ is the average cluster size, 𝑝𝑥 is within-cluster correlation, and 𝑝𝑒 is withinwhere 𝑁
cluster error correlation.
This equation provides clarity as to how within cluster correlation increases the
cluster corrected standard error when the assumption of independence is violated
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2010, 84). In practice STATA’s cluster option uses a weighting
matrix to correct for violations of the i.i.d assumption.
I compare the test statistics and standard errors from the pooled Tobit without
clustering to pooled Tobit with clustering in Table 4.
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Table 4: Effect of Clustered Standard Errors on
Test Statistics of Pooled Tobit Model

Variables
Time Trend
Electricity Price
Count of PV
Installations t-1
Insolation
ln(Businesses)
ln(Population
Density)
Income
Unemployment
Rebate
Loan
Sales Tax Waiver
SREC Prices
PerformanceBased Incentives
Net Metering
Interconnection

Pooled Tobit with
No Clustering
Test statistic
(standard error)
8.50***
(0.2346)
5.00***
(0.1474)
2.72***
(0.0230)
5.05***
(1.7520)
10.76***
(0.4028)
-2.66***
(0.3458)
-1.73
(0.00004)
-0.29
(0.1776)
9.75***
(0.2764)
4.61***
(0.7970)
8.81***
(0.1211)
3.97***
(0.0019)
2.29***
(0.8864)
3.85***
(2.0984)
-1.23*
(1.3588)
3.76***
(0.1713)

RPS Trend
Standard errors in parentheses
p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***

Pooled Tobit with Clustering
Test statistic
(standard error)
6.67***
(0.2990)
3.78***
(0.1948)
2.60***
(0.0240)
3.26***
(2.7157)
7.24***
(0.5985)
-2.12**
(0.4334)
-1.28
(0.00005)
-0.28
(0.1819)
7.47***
(0.3607)
3.50***
(1.0506)
7.10***
(0.1502)
4.37***
(0.0021)
1.84**
(1.1037)
3.02***
(2.6784)
-1.14*
(1.4704)
3.13***
(0.2057)

The standard errors, which are in parentheses, increase when clustered by county.
The inferential statistics without clustering could lead to incorrect inferences. Once the
standard errors are corrected, I can accurately make inferences. Next, I should compare
how the decision to reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis changes between the two
columns. The test statistic for performance-based incentives is the only change, and
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minor at that. Without clustering, it was significant at the one percent level. With
clustering, it is significant at the five percent level. While none of the inferences of
individual statics are affected by clustering, other inferential statistics such as the Wald
test for exogeneity might be. If I do not cluster the standard errors then I could make an
incorrect decision about the presence of endogeneity.
6.3 Instrumental Variables Tobit Estimator
The decision to adopt solar PV can be influenced by factors outside the scope of
this study. Unobserved market factors such as approved solar legislation or strength of
lobbyist groups can influence the decision for commercial consumers to adopt solar PV.
Both legislation and lobbyists provide indicators that there is support for solar PV.
However, the indicators simultaneously affect SREC prices. If suppliers of SRECs
(commercial adopters) believe that demand in the market will continue to grow due to
increased support for solar PV growth, then the market clearing price will increase. This
violates the exogeneity assumption from the pooled Tobit model that the independent
variables are uncorrelated with the error term.
I can address an endogenous variable by utilizing information from instruments.
The instruments should be correlated with the SREC prices and should not be correlated
with the error term from the model. A commonly used instrument is a lagged value of the
endogenous variable. In addition to using lagged SREC prices, I consider RPS
percentages, SACPs, and solar carve-out percentages. The RPS percentages were
obtained from Erik Johnson, and represent the percent of total generation in a state
portfolio that must come from renewable energy sources for state and year combinations
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(Johnson, 2014). The RPS percentages increase year to year until they reach the state
target. I use the number reported by Johnson for each states RPS percentage of MWh by
year.
The second instrument I consider are SACPs, which are payments that occur if an
LSE has not accrued enough SRECs. The payments are a dollar per MWh fee for each
credit that an LSE failed to acquire. SACP payments affect only LSEs and not the
decision of consumers directly. This meets the property of no correlation with the error
term from the main specification. In all states but Pennsylvania, the SACPs are set before
the market takes place. Pennsylvania sets the SACP price as a function of the market
price from the previous year (DSIRE, 2016).
My third instrument is solar carve-outs. These are a percent of total generation
that have to come from solar energy, and are generally a carve-out from the RPS
portfolio. The regional transmission organization for Maryland, Pennsylvania, New
Jersey, Delaware, and the District of Columbia, also known as PJM, provides solar carveout percentages for the five regions they oversee (PJM, 2016). New Hampshire and
Massachusetts carve-out percentages are taken from DSIRE. Each percentage is a
measure of how much generation must come from solar by each year in each state.
The final state with a carve-out policy is New York, and instead of using a
minimum percentage of sales requirement, the carve-out is an indirect function of total
electricity sales. For this reason, my first step in calculating the NY carve-out is to find
total electricity sales from the Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2015b). Then I
determine target MWh requirements and the required percentage of customer sited solar
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in each given year. The expected production from solar PV was found in yearly RPS
reports from NYSERDA, starting in 2008. I used the 2008 value for 2006 and 2007 since
they went unrecorded (NYSERDA, 2005). These percentages provide only the customer
sited PV target in megawatt hours. Lastly, I divided the value of customer sited MWh by
the total electricity sales, and took into account the load covered. This process results in a
nominal percentage which can be compared to all of the other percentages.
The instruments I chose must satisfy two conditions. First, they should be strongly
correlated with the right-hand side endogenous variable, SREC prices. The correlation
coefficients for the four instruments are reported in Table 5.
Table 5: Correlation Coefficients of Instruments with Respect to SREC Prices
Instrument

Correlation Coefficient

SACPs

0.74

RPS Percent of MWh requirement

0.24

Solar Carve-Out Percent

0.47

SREC Pricet-1

0.99

All of the correlation coefficients satisfy the condition that they are correlated to
the endogenous variable. The second condition is that the instruments are not correlated
with the error term, or 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝒛𝒊𝒕 𝝁𝒊𝒕 ) = 0. SACP payments are set a priori in all markets
except for Pennsylvania. The predetermined payments will only affect the maximum
price LSEs are willing to pay for SRECs. This means that any unobserved factors
affecting the current consumer decisions cannot affect predetermined SACPs.
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The correlation coefficient of RPS with SREC prices is the lowest out of all four
instruments. This may be expected since RPS can be met through a number of renewable
generation options. The correlation coefficient for solar-carve out percentage is much
higher at 0.47. The intuition is that higher percentage of required MWh means more
demand from LSEs. When there is more demand, then commercial customers can request
a higher price for their credits. Lastly, the correlation coefficient of previous year SREC
prices is 0.99. This result is expected since previous market prices are a good predictor of
future market prices. Since consumers pay attention to current SREC prices when making
their decision, previous SREC prices should not be correlated with the error term.
The software STATA executes the IV Tobit estimator which is comprised of two
equations. The procedure was introduced by Newey (1987). The first stage is a reduced
form equation with SREC prices as the dependent variable. The independent variables are
SACPs, solar carve-out percentages, and the non-endogenous variables from the main
specification. The next step is to predict values for SREC prices. Then the software
estimates the second stage, which is the main specification with the addition of the
residuals from the first stage.
I used the Wald test for exogeneity to determine whether or not endogeneity
exists in the model. The test is distributed 𝜒 2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number
of endogenous variables. The information needed for the test is coefficient for the
residuals of the first stage that are included in the second stage of the model. The null
hypothesis is that the coefficient of the residuals is equal to zero, or ρendog = 0. The
alternative hypothesis is that ρendog ≠ 0. If I reject the null, then there is evidence to
suggest that the model suffers from endogeneity. This conclusion means that the IV Tobit
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model is preferred over pooled Tobit since it addresses endogeneity. The p-value for the
Wald test was 0.0001. Since I reject the null hypothesis at the one percent level of
significance, I have evidence to suggest that the IV Tobit model is preferred over pooled
Tobit.
In order to test what instruments to include in the model I use an
overidentification test. The proper test is a minimum-distance estimator which is
distributed 𝜒 2 with degrees of freedom equal to the difference between the number of
instruments and endogenous variables (Newey, 1987). The null hypothesis is that all of
the instruments are valid. The alternative hypothesis is that at least one of the instruments
is not valid. The only combination of the four instruments which was not rejected at the
ten percent level was SACPs and solar carve-out percentages. The results are reported in
Table 6.
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Table 6: Coefficients from the IV Tobit and Pooled Tobit Estimators

Variables
Time Trend
Electricity Price
Count of PV Installationst-1
Insolation
ln(Businesses)
ln(Population Density)
Income
Unemployment
Rebate
Loan
Sales Tax Waiver
SREC Prices
Performance-Based Incentives
Net Metering
Interconnection
RPS Trend
Constant
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***

Pooled Tobit
1.995***
(0.299)
0.736***
(0.195)
0.06***
(0.024)
8.848***
(2.716)
4.336***
(0.599)
-0.918**
(0.433)
0
(0.0000)
-0.051
(0.182)
2.694***
(0.361)
3.674***
(1.051)
1.067***
(0.150)
0.008***
(0.002)
2.033*
(1.104)
8.083***
(2.678)
-1.675
(1.470)
0.644***
(0.206)
-116.282***
(13.699)

IV Tobit
2.245***
(0.308)
0.902***
(0.209)
0.047***
(0.024)
8.01***
(2.566)
4.168***
(0.583)
-0.868**
(0.412)
0
(0.0000)
-0.323*
(0.195)
2.556***
(0.370)
2.681***
(1.033)
0.919***
(0.155)
0.021***
(0.005)
2.93***
(1.110)
8.099***
(2.630)
-2.596*
(1.456)
0.506**
(0.204)
-111.052***
(13.017)

There are several important changes between the pooled Tobit and IV Tobit
coefficients. The coefficient for unemployment decreased from -0.051 to -0.323, and is
statistically significant at the ten percent level in the IV Tobit model. The coefficient for
SREC prices increased from 0.008 to 0.021, almost a 300 percent increase. Lastly, the
interconnection standard coefficient decreased from -1.675 to -2.596, and is now
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significant at the ten percent level. In the pooled Tobit model I suggested that the
negative coefficient is not problematic because the coefficient was insignificant. This
claim does not hold for the IV Tobit model.
6.4 Random Effects Tobit Estimator
Another issue that may arise in panel data estimation is unobserved heterogeneity.
Unobserved heterogeneity means that the current model does not account for differences
either between counties or within each county. The unobserved effect leads to biased
estimates. For linear estimators the researcher can test between fixed effects and random
effects. In the Tobit framework, there is no conditional fixed effects estimator that exists.
There is the possibility of creating indicator variables for each county and then estimating
an unconditional fixed effects estimator. The issue with this method is that the
unconditional fixed effects estimates are biased. Then I have to employ the RE Tobit
estimator given there is unobserved heterogeneity. I can test whether or not there is
unobserved heterogeneity by comparing results from the pooled Tobit estimator to the RE
Tobit estimator.
The RE Tobit estimator is defined as:
𝑌𝑖𝑡 ∗ = 𝛽0 + 𝒙𝒊𝒕 𝜷 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡
where 𝜇𝑖𝑡 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜇2 ), 𝛼𝑖 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝛼2 ), 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = max(0, 𝑌𝑖𝑡 ∗ ), and and 𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 .
The term 𝛼𝑖 represents the unobserved effect. Every term except for 𝛼𝑖 is the same as in
the pooled Tobit estimator. In order to estimate the RE Tobit model, I need estimates for
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the variance of each error component. This information is used in a weighting matrix to
find the RE Tobit estimates.
Before looking at any of the coefficients, I need to determine if there is
unobserved heterogeneity in the model. Recall that the RE Tobit model has the extra
term, 𝛼𝑖 , whereas the pooled Tobit model treats each observation as independent over
county and time. The variance of the unobserved error component is 𝜎𝛼 2 = 0. The pooled
Tobit estimator does not utilize any information about the variance due to the unobserved
component. I use an LR test to determine whether pooled Tobit or RE Tobit is the
preferred estimator. The null hypothesis is that 𝜎𝛼 2 = 0, and the alternative is that
𝜎𝛼 2 > 0. If I reject the null then I have evidence to suggest that there is variation due to
the unobserved effect, and I should use the RE Tobit estimator. The p-value from the LR
test is 0.000, which suggests that unobserved heterogeneity is present. The coefficients
from the RE Tobit estimator can be found in Table 7, where I compare the results to
estimates from the pooled Tobit model.
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Table 7: Coefficients from the RE Tobit and Pooled Tobit Estimators

Variables

Pooled Tobit
1.995***
Time Trend
(0.299)
0.736***
Electricity Price
(0.195)
0.06***
Count of PV Installations t-1
(0.024)
8.848***
Insolation
(2.716)
4.336***
ln(Businesses)
(0.599)
-0.918**
ln(Population Density)
(0.433)
0
Income
(0.0000)
-0.051
Unemployment
(0.182)
2.694***
Rebate
(0.361)
3.674***
Loan
(1.051)
1.067***
Sales Tax Waiver
(0.150)
0.008***
SREC Prices
(0.002)
2.033*
Performance-based Incentives
(1.104)
8.083***
Net Metering
(2.678)
-1.675
Interconnection
(1.470)
0.644***
RPS Trend
(0.206)
-116.282***
Constant
(13.699)
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses
p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***

RE Tobit
1.813***
(0.302)
0.683***
(0.160)
0.019
(0.021)
9.922***
(2.954)
4.580***
(0.669)
-0.915
(0.643)
0
(0.0001)
0.566***
(0.215)
3.095***
(0.341)
4.494***
(1.175)
0.984***
(0.141)
0.004*
(0.002)
4.045***
(1.101)
4.771**
(2.319)
-1.943
(1.372)
0.336
(0.258)
-124.150***
(13.997)

In the RE Tobit model the effect of number of solar PV installations in the
previous year is no longer significant on the amount of solar PV capacity added. The size
of the coefficient for population density remained similar between pooled and RE Tobit,
but the increase in standard error caused the coefficient to be statistically insignificant.
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A major change is that unemployment is now statistically significant, and has a
positive coefficient. At first this surprised me, since I thought unemployment would
measure the strength of each county’s economy. However, during the recession the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act provided subsidies and PACE loan programs
which have a strong effect on solar PV adoption.
There are two notable changes to incentive variables. First, the coefficient for
performance-based incentives almost doubled from 2.033 to 4.045. Second, the
coefficient for RPS Trend is no longer significant. One issue with the RE Tobit estimator
is that all variables must be exogenous, otherwise the estimates are inconsistent. Even
though I address unobserved heterogeneity, I have not accounted for endogeneity of
SREC prices.
The RE Tobit model does not allow for clustering of standard errors, but I know
that the errors are not independent. Instead of clustering standard errors I can use
bootstrapped standard errors. The bootstrap process begins with a random draw of
samples from the dataset with replacement. The random draw assumes that the dataset is
representative of the population. Once the draw is complete, each parameter is estimated.
This process repeats for the RE Tobit estimator 50 times. With more repetitions the
bootstrapped estimates converge to the true parameter value, but I keep the default of 50
draws. Then, STATA calculates the sample standard deviation of the sampling
distribution of the parameters. This process is similar to a Monte Carlo simulation, except
that it draws from a sample dataset and not the population. The bootstrap procedure has
been shown to provide similar results to the cluster procedure when independence and
homogeneity are violated (Guan, 2003).
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6.5 Preferred Estimator for Analysis
There is no estimator that can account for unobserved heterogeneity and
endogeneity at the same time in the Tobit framework. I must choose between the IV and
RE Tobit estimators. One limitation of the RE Tobit model is that the estimates are
inconsistent if there is an endogenous variable. If I use the IV Tobit estimator, I fail to
account for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. This seems counter-intuitive when
so much work was done to account for differences between and across counties in the
Northeast states and the District of Columbia. Therefore I suggest that estimates from the
RE Tobit model are preferable in this study.
It is still important to compare results from both RE and IV Tobit estimators since
they both have benefits and limitations. Recall that the standard errors in the IV Tobit
model are clustered at the county level and the RE Tobit standard errors are bootstrapped.
Both of these processes address non-independence of the error term. The results are
reported in Table 8.
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Table 8: Comparison of Coefficients from the IV Tobit and RE Tobit Estimators

Variables
Time Trend
Electricity Price
Count of PV Installations t-1
Insolation
ln(Businesses)
ln(Population Density)
Income
Unemployment
Rebate
Loan
Sales Tax Waiver
SREC Prices
Performance-based
Incentives
Net Metering
Interconnection
RPS Trend

IV Tobit
2.245***
(0.308)
0.902***
(0.209)
0.047***
(0.024)
8.01***
(2.566)
4.168***
(0.583)
-0.868**
(0.412)
0
(0.0000)
-0.323*
(0.195)
2.556***
(0.370)
2.681***
(1.033)
0.919***
(0.155)
0.021***
(0.005)
2.93***
(1.110)
8.099***
(2.630)
-2.596*
(1.456)
0.506**
(0.204)
-111.052***
(13.017)

Constant
Standard errors in parentheses
p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***

RE Tobit
1.813***
(0.302)
0.683***
(0.160)
0.019
(0.021)
9.922***
(2.954)
4.580***
(0.669)
-0.915
(0.643)
0
(0.0001)
0.566***
(0.215)
3.095***
(0.341)
4.494***
(1.175)
0.984***
(0.141)
0.004*
(0.002)
4.045***
(1.101)
4.771**
(2.319)
-1.943
(1.372)
0.336
(0.258)
-124.150***
(13.997)

There are several differences between the two models. The IV Tobit estimate for
change in solar installations by year and county is significant at the one percent level,
while RE Tobit estimate is not significant.

The coefficients for population density are

similar between the two models, but the IV Tobit coefficient is significant whereas the
RE Tobit is not. The most dramatic difference is change of sign between the
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unemployment coefficients. The coefficients from both estimators are significant at the
ten percent level. In the RE Tobit estimator I explain why the positive sign for the
coefficient may make sense.
There are also differences in the coefficients of the solar policies. The loan
program coefficients are both significant at the one percent level, but the RE Tobit
coefficient is larger: the IV Tobit coefficient is 2.68 and the RE Tobit coefficient is 4.49.
The SREC coefficient for the IV Tobit estimator is 0.02, while the RE Tobit coefficient is
0.004. This means that the impact of SREC prices would be greater if I used the IV Tobit
estimates. The two coefficients for interconnection standard are negative, but the IV
Tobit coefficient is significant at the ten percent level. Lastly, the IV Tobit RPS
coefficient is significant, while it is insignificant in the RE Tobit model.
6.6 Alternative Model Specifications
Before providing policy implications I want to check robustness of the results
with specifications that include different environmental preference variables and Likert
scale values for interconnection and net metering. The alternative environmental
preferences are LCV scores for the House of Representatives and Senate voting records.
They are excluded from the main specification because no grades exist for the District of
Columbia (DC). In the alternative specification I drop DC in order to estimate the model.
The LR test for including LCV House and LCV Senate voting grades provided a p-value
of 0.0000, meaning that at least one of the coefficients is significant. Unlike the full
model, the model with LCV variables has statistically significant coefficients for

62

environmental preferences. The results are compared to the RE Tobit model in column 2
of Table 9.
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Table 9: Coefficients from Alternative RE Tobit specifications

Variables

Time Trend
Electricity Price
Count of PV Installationst-1
Insolation
ln(Businesses)
ln(Population Density)
Income
Unemployment
Rebate
Loan
Sales Tax Waiver
SREC Prices
Performance-based
Incentives
Net Metering
Interconnection
RPS Trend

RE Tobit (1)
1.813***
(0.302)
0.683***
(0.160)
0.019
(0.021)
9.922***
(2.954)
4.580***
(0.669)
-0.915
(0.643)
0
(0.0001)
0.566***
(0.215)
3.095***
(0.341)
4.494***
(1.175)
0.984***
(0.141)
0.004*
(0.002)
4.045***
(1.101)
4.771**
(2.319)
-1.943
(1.372)
0.336
(0.258)

RE Tobit with
LCV (2)
1.654***
(0.283)
0.828***
(0.211)
0.012
(0.022)
10.287***
(2.846)
4812***
(0.689)
-1.181
(0.572)
0
(0.000)
0.548**
(0.2219)
3.036***
(0.358)
4.470***
(1.074)
0.958***
(0.163)
0.003*
(0.002)
3.791***
(1.057)
4.097**
(2.5671)
-1.515
(1.438)
0.388*
(0.224)

LCV Senate Grade

0.041***
(0.013)

LCV House of
Representatives Grade

-0.050**
(0.021)

RE Tobit with
Grades (3)
1.748***
(0.2737)
1.391***
(0.2283)
0.023
(0.0198)
8.171***
(2.597)
4.072***
(0.5952)
-0.701
(0.4342)
0
(0.0000)
0.380**
(0.1932)
2.141***
(0.3431)
4.450***
(1.1970)
0.370**
(0.1715)
0.009***
(0.0021)
0.671
(1.1966)

0.547**
(0.236)

Net Metering Grade

1.407**
(0.4390)

Interconnection Grade

-0.810*
(0.4517)

-124.2***
Constant
(13.997)
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***
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-130.7***
(11.441)

-118***
(15.555)

Comparing the main specification in column 1 with the LCV specification in
column 2, there is little change in coefficients. An interesting aspect of the LCV
specification is that the coefficient for RPS trend is now significant at the ten percent
level. This further corroborates ambiguity of the effect of RPS over time on solar PV
adoption. Coefficients for LCV House of Representatives and Senate variables are
significant at the five percent level. It is surprising that the grades are significant with
different signs when I expected that an increase in the amount of pro votes for
environmental legislation would cause an increase in solar PV adoption. The most
important conclusion from the alternative specification with LCV grades is that other
than the statistical significance of RPS trend, there are no changes between the models.
The second specification replaces the binary representation of net metering and
interconnection standard with grades created by Freeing the Grid. The data start in 2007,
which means that there are 600 fewer observations in the study. Results from the RE
Tobit estimation with grades for the two regulations can be found in column 3 of Table 9.
None of the controls are affected significantly by the new measures. This is not true for
incentives. RPS trend is significant at the ten percent, while in the preferred specification
it is not statistically significant. The magnitude of the coefficient for performance-based
incentives decreased by 75 percent from the preferred model and is now statistically
insignificant. Lastly, the magnitude of sales tax waivers decreases by 66 percent, but is
still statistically significant.
The interpretation and magnitude of the net metering and interconnection
coefficients changes from the preferred model. In the alternative specification both
coefficients are smaller in magnitude. In the main specification the coefficients represent
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an increase in solar PV capacity if a county went from no standards to adopting
standards. In the alternative specification an increase in the coefficient represents what
would happen if the grade given to the state increased by one unit. The alternative
specification suggests that the negative coefficient of interconnection standards is
significant at the ten percent level. As in all other specifications, it is an unexpected result
that the coefficient for interconnection standards is negative.
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CHAPTER 7
POLICY IMPACTS
7.1 Deriving Marginal Effects
The purpose of using MLE is to address the non-linear nature of the data. The
regression function is not going to be linear like it is with OLS. Each coefficient
estimated by RE Tobit is a slope coefficient, but the slope of the MLE function is not
constant. Therefore, I must evaluate the coefficient at certain values to determine the
marginal effect. Recall that the unconditional expectation is:
𝒙𝜷
𝒙𝜷
𝐸[𝑦|𝒙] = Φ ( ) 𝒙𝜷 + 𝜎𝜙 ( )
σ
σ
The marginal effect of interest is the derivative of the expectation with respect to variable
𝑥𝑗 :
𝜕𝐸(𝑦|𝒙)
𝒙𝜷
= 𝛽𝑗 Φ ( )
𝜕𝑥𝑗
σ
𝒙𝜷

where 𝛽𝑗 is the coefficient of variable 𝑥𝑗 and Φ ( σ ) is the cumulative density function
of the standard normal random variable.
The equivalent marginal effect of variable 𝑥𝑗 for the OLS estimator would be 𝛽𝑗 .
𝒙𝜷

The marginal effect for the RE Tobit estimated coefficient is adjusted by the term Φ ( σ ),
which takes on a value between zero and one. This means that the sign of the coefficient
from the RE Tobit will match the marginal effect, but the magnitude of the marginal
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𝒙𝜷

effect will differ by Φ ( σ ). Within the weighting term the researcher must choose
specific values of the independent variables to estimate the marginal effect.
There are two different procedures to estimate the marginal effect of a given
variable: the average partial effect (APE) and the partial average effect (PAE). The
purpose of both methods is to evaluate the marginal effect of a particular variable at a
certain value. I evaluate some variables at their means and others at specific values. What
is different about the two procedures is how they proceed with all the other variables held
constant.
The APE evaluates variables of interest by using the average of all other
variables. This is problematic in my study, since many of the incentive programs are
represented with binary variables. The mean of 0.46 for loan programs represents the fact
that 46 percent of the 2700 county-years had a loan program. But using 0.46 as the
average amount of loan programs offered does not have an intuitive meaning.
The other process, PAE, replaces each individual value for our variable of interest
with one value I impose for all 2700 observations. Then it estimates a marginal effect
using the original values of every other variable, meaning binary values are only zeros or
ones. Lastly, we average the 2700 marginal effects. Since several of the incentive
variables are binary, I will use the PAE.6

6

The marginal effects from the APE process are larger than the PAE marginal effects. This result is
expected. See Appendix B for comparison between the APE and PEA marginal effects.
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7.2 Non-Incentive Marginal Effects
I estimated the marginal effects of non-incentive variables, all of which are
evaluated at their means. The numbers reported in Table 10 with asterisks represent
statistically significant marginal effects, while the standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 10: Marginal Effects of Non-Incentive Variables
𝜕𝐸(𝑦|𝒙)

Variables

𝜕𝑥𝑗

Time Trend
Electricity Price
Count of PV Installations t-1
Insolation
ln(Businesses)
ln(Population Density)
Income
Unemployment
Standard errors in parentheses
p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***

using PAE

0.586***
(0.094)
0.223***
(0.051)
0.006
(0.007)
3.349***
(1.048)
1.427***
(0.208)
-0.316
(0.229)
0
(0.0000)
0.191***
(0.072)

I expect that the marginal effect of the time trend is positive, since it captures the
fact that installation costs decreased over the study period. An increase from the year
2013 to 2014 causes a 58.6 percent increase in added solar PV, holding all else constant.
The time trend could be capturing the trend of third party installations, changes in solar
preferences compared to other energy technologies, and installation costs. Installation
costs cannot continue to fall like they have been over the study period; therefore the
effect of a time trend should be examined in future studies.
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The effect of a one cent per kilowatt hour increase in electricity prices is a 22.3
percent increase in added solar PV capacity, holding all else constant. If electricity prices
increased from the average over our study of 11.6 cents/kWh to the maximum value 17.1
cents/kWh, then added solar capacity would increase 122.7 percent holding all else
constant. A one kWh/m2/day increase in solar insolation causes a 334.9 percent increase
in solar PV capacity, holding all else constant. This marginal effect is the largest per unit
change of any of the variables. However, the marginal effect cannot be larger than 308.78
percent since the difference between the minimum and maximum value of solar
insolation in the study is 0.922.
The next variable of interest is number of businesses in a county which varies by
year. As more businesses are added to a county there are more customers to adopt solar
PV. The marginal effect of number of businesses has a different meaning from the other
controls. Since I took the natural log of number of businesses, the marginal effect of a
one percent increase in the number of businesses is a 1.4 percent increase in solar PV
capacity, holding all else constant. The positive effect is consistent with expectations.
Lastly, I expected that unemployment would have a negative impact on added solar PV
capacity. Earlier I suggested that the introduction of stimulus money during the recession
could allow firms to adopt solar PV when they would not have otherwise. The marginal
effect is that a one percent increase in unemployment causes a 19.1 percent increase in
solar PV capacity, holding all else constant.
There are several variables which do not have a significant effect on the model. It
is important to acknowledge the expected effect, but I do not attempt to interpret them.
The first variable is count of solar PV installations from the previous year, that has a
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small statistically insignificant marginal effect. I expected that the marginal effect of
population density would be negative since denser areas have less rooftop and ground
mounting space for solar installations. While the marginal effect is negative it is also
insignificant. The final insignificant control is income which has zero marginal effect on
solar PV adoption and is insignificant.
7.3 Solar Marker Policy Variable Impacts
First I want to address policy variables with insignificant marginal effects, which
can be found in Table 11.
Table 11: Policy Variables with Insignificant Marginal Effects
𝜕𝐸(𝑦|𝒙)

Variables

𝜕𝑥𝑗

Interconnection
RPS Trend
Standard errors in parentheses
p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***

using PAE

-0.666
(0.481)
0.112
(0.084)

I expected that if a county had interconnection standards they would adopt more solar
PV. The marginal effect, albeit statistically insignificant, suggests that there is a negative
effect of interconnection standards which differs from my expectations. As the tenure of
RPS standards increases, the percentage of MWh required from renewable sources
becomes larger. Therefore I expect the coefficient to be positive. The coefficient is
positive, but is insignificant in the main specification. RPS trend is the only coefficient
that is significant in IV Tobit, pooled Tobit, and alternative RE Tobit specifications, but
not the main RE Tobit specification. Therefore I am wary to conclude that RPS trend is
unimportant in explaining solar PV growth.
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All of the other policy variables have statistically significant marginal effects.
Marginal effects of the binary variables can be found in Table 12.
Table 12: Marginal Effects of Incentives Coded as Binary Variables
𝜕𝐸(𝑦|𝒙)

Variables

𝜕𝑥𝑗

Loan
Performance-based Incentives
Net Metering
Standard errors in parentheses
p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***

using PAE

1.470***
(0.373)
1.358***
(0.372)
1.580**
(0.777)

The marginal effects for binary variables are the impact of a state providing a policy
where it otherwise did not exist. It is interesting to note that the effects of loan programs,
performance-based incentives, and net metering are all similar. The marginal effects may
be similar, but the order in which policies are implemented can have an effect on the
success of later policies (Krasko and Doris, 2013).
If a loan program is available at the state level, then there is a 147 percent
increase in solar PV capacity at the county level, holding all else constant. The
introduction of performance-based incentives causes a 135.8 percent increase in solar PV
capacity additions, holding all else constant. Lastly, if a state provides net metering
standards, solar PV capacity increases by 158 percent at the county level. Over the study
period, 91 percent of county-year observations had some degree of net metering
standards in place, meaning policy administrators have done a good job at recognizing
how important net metering is to solar PV growth. Performance-based incentives, on the
other hand, exist in only New York and Maine, where both programs started in 2011.
Delaware, West Virginia, and Rhode Island currently do not offer loan programs. The
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funding for many loan programs originates from the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act, meaning continuation of these programs would have to be done with
other funds. This research is helpful in separating the impact of loan programs from other
subsidies on solar PV capacity.
The continuous incentive variables include SREC prices, rebates, and sales tax
waivers. I evaluate the marginal effects of these variables at specific values. The reason is
that using multiple values provides a clearer picture of the effects for different counties.
While the mean SREC price was $51.18, the maximum it reached during the study was
$668.01. I evaluate the effect of SREC prices at $50, $100, $250, and $400 in Table 13.
Table 13: SREC Prices Marginal Effects
𝜕𝐸(𝑦|𝒙)

SREC Prices at:

𝜕𝑥𝑗

50 dollars/ MWh
100 dollars/ MWh
250 dollars/ MWh
400 dollars/ MWh
Standard errors in parentheses
p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***

using PAE

0.00135**
(0.0007)
0.00137**
(0.0007)
0.00141**
(0.0007)
0.00144**
(0.0008)

When potential solar PV customers see that their credits could provide more
money in the long run, then they are more likely to adopt solar PV. A 100 dollar/MWh
increase in SREC prices evaluated at 50, 100, 250, or 400 dollars causes a 14 percent
increase in solar PV capacity, holding all else constant. Increasing SREC prices by 100
dollars/MWh would require dramatic changes to the setup of SREC markets. The first
change could be an increase in the solar-carve out percentage. Alternatively, the SACP
could increase by 100 dollars which increases the price ceiling. Administrators should be
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cautious of relying on the SREC markets to increase solar PV capacity since it does not
appear to be as effective as other programs.
I follow a similar procedure with rebate prices. I am interested in the marginal
effects at lower values because rebate amounts fell during the study period. Table 14
shows the five values for which I estimate marginal effects.
Table 14: Rebate Marginal Effects
𝜕𝐸(𝑦|𝒙)

Rebate amount at:

𝜕𝑥𝑗

0.25 dollars/kW
0.5 dollars/kW
1 dollar/kW
2 dollar/kW
3 dollar/kW
Standard errors in parentheses
p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***

using PAE

0.871***
(0.084)
0.927***
(0.095)
1.000***
(0.111)
1.156***
(0.146)
1.323***
(0.184)

As rebate amounts increase, the upfront cost of adopting solar PV declines. A dollar
increase in rebates from 0.25 dollar/kW causes an 87.1 percent increase in solar PV
capacity holding all else constant. An increase from 3 dollars/kW to 4 dollars/kW causes
a 132.3 percent increase in solar PV capacity, holding all else constant. The difference in
marginal effects can be extremely helpful when administrators are designing a rebate
program since there are benefits to each rebate amount. Increasing the 25 cents/kW rebate
to 1.25 dollars/kW has a smaller marginal effect, but the program costs less for
administrators to run. Raising the rebate from 3 dollars/kW to 4 dollars/kW has a larger
marginal effect, but requires more funding.
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Finally, I measure the sales tax waiver at actual sales tax percentages. The mean
sales tax if I include every observation would be 1.69 percent due to the large number of
counties without a sales tax waiver. I will measure the marginal effect of a sales tax
waiver at four existing values: 5, 6, 7, and 8 percent.
Table 15: Marginal Effects at Different Sales Tax Rates
𝜕𝐸(𝑦|𝒙)

Sales Tax Waiver at:

𝜕𝑥𝑗

5 percent
6 percent
7 percent
8 percent
Standard errors in parentheses.
p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***

using PAE

0.381***
(0.058)
0.398***
(0.063)
0.417***
(0.068)
0.435***
(0.073)

The positive coefficient confirms my expectations that a sales tax waiver increases the
amount of solar PV adoption. An increase from a five percent to a six percent sales tax
causes a 38.1 percent increase in solar PV adoption, holding all else constant. It would be
unlikely for administrators just to change the sales tax to spur solar PV growth. It is more
likely that administrators in the six regions without a sales tax waiver can introduce the
incentive. The cost of such a program is lost tax revenue from the process of installing
solar PV.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
The goal of this research is to examine whether incentive policies have a
significant impact on solar PV adoption when controlling for demographic
characteristics, market factors, and pro-environmental preferences. The results suggest
that every incentive except interconnection standards and RPS trend increased solar PV
adoption. There is little impact on solar PV growth when SREC prices increase by a
reasonable amount, yet more states are introducing SREC markets. Administrators should
consider continuing loan programs or introducing loan programs to increase solar PV
growth.
Solar PV growth is also influenced by solar market factors. Solar insolation,
electricity prices, and the number of businesses all play an important role in the amount
of solar PV capacity added. Unlike findings in the residential sector from Crago and
Chernyakhovskiy (2014), the number of installations in the previous year does not have a
statistically significant effect on the amount of capacity during the current year. Contrary
to Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2011), the only statistically significant demographic
control was unemployment with an unexpected sign. This suggests that the decision to
adopt commercial solar is motivated primarily by the payback period and available solar
policies.
All of the incentive programs, with the exception of sales tax waivers in New
York, vary at the state level only. None of the programs I evaluate vary at the county
level. Future research can utilize within-state variation in loan or subsidy programs to reestimate county level effects. This research does not attempt to estimate the cost
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effectiveness of each incentive program. Further research should be carried out similar to
Crago and Chernyakhovskiy (2014) to determine the cost effectiveness of commercial
solar PV programs. Solar PV capacity in the United States continues to expand. However,
commercial sector growth fell 52 percent from 2012 to 2013. One explanation is that
New Jersey, the state with the most added solar capacity, discontinued the rebate program
in 2013. As we saw, the marginal effect of rebate programs is significant, so shutting
down a successful program in the largest state may have affected overall commercial
solar PV adoption. With the results from this paper, renewable energy program
administrators can more accurately pursue those policies that spur solar PV growth in the
commercial sector.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
LINEAR ESTIMATION OF SOLAR PV CAPACITY
I use panel data, where the specified model is the same as the one explained in the
Methodology section:
ln(𝑌𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝛼0 + β1 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝜃2 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡 + 𝑓(𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠)
+ 𝑓(𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠) + 𝑓(𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠) + 𝜇𝑖𝑡
The first assumption of the classical linear model is that the model is correctly
identified and linear in its parameters. Another key assumption is the expected value of
the error term is zero, and the covariance with each of the regressors is zero (Wooldridge,
2010). Issues arise with this assumption if the model contains endogenous variables. If
the expected value of the error term is zero and the covariance with right hand side
variables is zero, then I can claim that the OLS estimator is asymptotically unbiased.
A third assumption is that the rank of 𝐸[𝒙𝒊𝒕 ′ 𝒙𝒊𝒕 ] = 𝐾, where K is the number of
independent regressors. This assumption is violated when two variables can be written as
a linear function of one another. Lastly we have the assumptions that the 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝝁𝒊𝒕 , 𝝁𝒊𝒋 ) =
0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸[𝝁𝒊𝒕 ′𝝁𝒊𝒕 ] = 𝜎 2 . The model suffers from autocorrelation if 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝝁𝒊𝒕 , 𝝁𝒊𝒋 ) ≠ 0. This
means that off diagonal values in the covariance matrix of the residuals will not equal
zero. A common violation of the second assumption is that 𝐸[𝝁𝒊𝒕 ′𝝁𝒊𝒕 ] = 𝜎𝑖2 , which
means that the diagonal value in the covariance matrix changes with each cross section.
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If the final two assumptions are met then I can claim that the estimators are
consistent. Additionally, the estimator should be asymptotically efficient. That is, my
preferred estimator will approach the true parameter faster than any other consistent
estimator. The estimator in this case is pooled OLS. The term pooled is similar for the
pooled Tobit estimator, meaning that the data is treated as one large cross section of 2700
observations.
Although this paper incorporates environmental preferences, demographic and
market characteristics, and incentives, it still suffers from omitted variables bias. There
are market conditions that go uncaptured during model specification. Two examples are
strength of lobbyist groups in each state and proposed legislation that affects the solar
market. These market conditions affect the demand for solar capacity, which on its own is
not an issue. What causes biased and inconsistent results is the fact that SREC prices are
also affected by unobserved market conditions. In this case, the 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝒙𝒊𝒕 𝝁𝒊𝒕 ) ≠ 0, and the
model is subject to endogeneity bias. A common method to mitigate endogeneity bias is
the instrumental variables (IV) approach. If I am to utilize the IV approach, I must
observe a variable or set of variables that have two properties. First, the instruments
cannot be correlated with the error term, or 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝒛𝒊𝒕 𝝁𝒊𝒕 ) = 0, where 𝒛𝒊𝒕 is the set of
instruments. The second property requires that the instruments be highly correlated with
the SREC prices. As I discussed in the IV Tobit estimator section, the two instruments I
use are SACPs and solar carve-out percentages.
Once I define acceptable instruments the proper IV approach to implement is two
stage least squares (2SLS) since I have more than one instrument to explain the
endogenous variable. The process of 2SLS begins with the first stage model where I
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̂.
obtain fitted values of 𝒙
𝑘 The first-stage must include the exogenous explanatory
variables from the original model, otherwise the second stage leads to biased and
inconsistent results. The second stage uses fitted values from the first-stage regression to
replace the endogenous variable.
If the instruments satisfy both properties then the new estimates are consistent. I
can employ a Hausman test to choose between the 2SLS results and pooled OLS. The
Hausman test is an application of the Wald test which is distributed chi-square. If I reject
the null hypothesis that 𝒙𝒊𝒕 and 𝝁𝒊𝒕 are independent I conclude that pooled OLS estimates
are inconsistent and prefer the 2SLS estimates. If I fail to reject the null, then 𝒙𝒊𝒕 and
𝝁𝒊𝒕 are independent and I conclude that both pooled OLS and 2SLS are consistent, but
pooled OLS is more efficient thus pooled OLS yields better estimates. The p-values from
the Hausman test is 0.566, therefore I fail to reject the null that 𝒙𝒊𝒕 and 𝝁𝒊𝒕 are
independent. This suggests that pooled OLS is consistent and more efficient, meaning the
OLS estimated are preferred. This result contradicts results from the Tobit estimator.
Again, unobserved heterogeneity is a problem due to omission of specific effects
in the model. Say that the correct model is:
ln(𝑌𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝛼0 + β1 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝜃2 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡 + 𝑓(𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑠)
+ 𝑓(𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠) + 𝑓(𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠) + 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡
Unobserved heterogeneity is present when the unobserved variables are correlated with
other variables in the model. Since 𝑎𝑖 is part of the error term and it is correlated with our
variables, the model provides inconsistent results due to endogeneity bias.
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The Bruesch-Pagan test is an important test to run before correcting for
unobserved heterogeneity. The test statistic is asymptotically distributed chi-square and
utilizes information about the residuals from the fully restricted model, which is the
pooled OLS estimator. The null hypothesis is that 𝜎𝛼2 = 0, and the alternative hypothesis
is that 𝜎𝛼2 > 0. The term 𝜎𝛼2 is the variance of the random error component which is not
included in the OLS model. If I reject the null hypothesis I have evidence to suggest there
is an unobserved effect that I do not account for in pooled OLS. The p-value from the
Bruesch-Pagan test is 0.000, therefore I have evidence to suggest that there is an
unobserved individual component, and I should use either the random effects or fixed
effects estimator.
I can either address unobserved heterogeneity through fixed or random effects.
The fixed effects estimator I employ is the Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV)
model. I chose to use the LSDV estimates because the degrees of freedom from the
estimation process do not need to be corrected. The LSDV estimation process is aptly
named since it requires creation of binary variables for each cross section. The LSDV
model utilizes the pooled OLS estimation method. Each set of binary variables captures
the unobserved effect that is intrinsic to a county in our dataset.
One issue that arises from any fixed effects method is that time-invariant variables
vanish from the model. This means that solar insolation, which variables by county,
cannot be estimated. Additionally, the LSDV estimator does not work well with a short
panel. A panel is considered short when there are a lot of cross-sections over a short time
period. Since I use 300 counties over nine years, my dataset can be considered a short
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panel. Therefore, I should consider another estimator that can deal with unobserved
heterogeneity; the random effects estimator.
The random effects estimator assumes that the unobserved effect 𝑎𝑖 has zero
correlation between the explanatory variable and unobserved effect (Wooldridge, 2010).
The first assumption of the random effects model is 𝐸[𝑐𝑖 |𝑥𝑖 ] = 𝐸[𝑐𝑖 ] = 0 which
represents the zero correlation between the unobserved effect and explanatory variables.
When I estimate the random effects model it is necessary to use the Generalized Least
Squares (GLS) framework. The covariance matrix in a random effects model is
𝛺𝑖
𝛺 = [0
0

0
⋱
0

𝜎𝑢2 + 𝜎𝑎2
0
0 ] 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝛺𝑖 = [ 𝜎𝑢2
𝛺𝑛
𝜎𝑢2

𝜎𝑢2
⋱
𝜎𝑢2

𝜎𝑢2
𝜎𝑢2 ]
𝜎𝑢2 + 𝜎𝑎2

where σ2u is the variance for the idiosyncratic error component, and σ2a is the variance for
the random error component.
Once I have consistent estimates for 𝜎𝑢2 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜎𝑎2 I can estimate the random effects
model. Since I am using an estimate for the grand omega matrix, the proper name for the
estimator is estimated generalized least squares (EGLS).
Lastly, I can incorporate solutions to both endogeneity and unobserved
heterogeneity with the instrumental variables random effects (RE IV) estimator. The
results from pooled OLS, instrumental variables, and RE IV estimators are reported in
Table 16.
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Table 16: Marginal effects of different estimators

Variables

Pooled OLS
0.43***
Time Trend
(0.11)
0.00
Electricity Price
(0.08)
Count of PV
0.10***
Installations t-1
(0.02)
2.82*
Insolation
(1.11)
1.11***
ln(Businesses)
(0.23)
ln(Population
0.05
Density)
(0.18)
0
Income
(0.00)
0.02
Unemployment
(0.07)
0.69***
Rebate
(0.15)
0.13
Loan
(0.47)
0.45***
Sales Tax Waiver
(0.07)
0.01***
SREC Prices
(0.00)
Performance-based
2.38***
Incentives
(0.64)
0.41
Net Metering
(0.47)
0.31
Interconnection
(0.39)
0.47***
RPS Trend
(0.09)
Standard errors in parentheses
p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***

RE IV

RE Tobit

0.48***
(0.08)
-0.01
(0.06)
0.07*
(0.01)
2.24*
(0.88)
0.96****
(0.18)
0.146***
(0.17)
0
(0.00)
-0.09
(0.08)
0.72***
(0.11)
0.39***
(0.34)
0.36*
(0.06)
0.01
(0.00)
2.97***
(0.41)
-0.36
(0.45)
0.48
(0.39)
0.46***
(0.07)

0.586***
(0.094)
0.223***
(0.051)
0.006
(0.007)
3.349***
(1.048)
1.427***
(0.208)
-0.316
(0.229)
0
(0.0000)
0.191***
(0.072)
1.000***
(0.111)
1.470***
(0.373)
0.398***
(0.063)
0.00137**
(0.0007)
1.358***
(0.372)
1.580**
(0.777)
-0.666
(0.481)
0.112
(0.084)

I use an RE IV estimator to address the presence of unobserved heterogeneity and
endogeneity in the linear framework. The results from the RE IV linear estimator and the
RE Tobit estimator are not similar. The RE IV marginal effect of electricity prices is
insignificant and negative, whereas the RE Tobit marginal effect is positive and
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statistically significant. The marginal effect of population density in the RE IV model is
positive and statistically significant. This result contradicts my expectation that
population density will have a negative effect on installed solar PV.
The marginal effect of loan programs is much smaller from the RE IV estimate,
which is problematic since this is one of the policies I suggest administrators consider for
continued use in the future. The effect of SREC prices is roughly ten times larger from
the RE IV coefficient compared to the RE Tobit marginal effect. Not only is there a
difference in magnitude, but the result from the RE IV model is insignificant. Lastly, the
marginal effect from the RE IV estimate of net metering is statistically insignificant with
a negative effect. This is an unexpected result, especially since the program has such a
large marginal effect in the RE Tobit model. The contradictions from the RE IV estimator
suggest that the results from the linear estimates are biased. This confirms that the RE
Tobit estimator is preferred over even the best linear model.
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APPENDIX B
MARGINAL EFFECTS FROM RANDOM EFFECTS TOBIT MODEL
Table 17: Marginal Effects Evaluated at the Mean
𝜕𝐸(𝑦|𝒙)

Variables

𝜕𝑥𝑗

Time Trend
Electricity Price
Count of PV
Installations t-1
Insolation
ln(Businesses)
ln(Population Density)
Income
Unemployment
Rebate
Loan
Sales Tax Waiver
SREC Prices
Performance-based
Incentives
Net Metering
Interconnection
RPS Trend
Standard errors in parentheses
p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***

using PEA

0.586***
(0.094)
0.223***
(0.051)
0.006
(0.007)
3.349***
(1.048)
1.427***
(0.208)
-0.316
(0.229)
0
(0.0000)
0.191***
(0.072)
1.016***
(0.115)
1.470***
(0.373)
0.325***
(0.042)
0.001**
(0.0007)
1.358***
(0.372)
1.580**
(0.777)
-0.666
(0.481)
0.112
(0.084)
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𝜕𝐸(𝑦|𝒙)
𝜕𝑥𝑗

using APE

0.458***
(0.072)
0.172***
(0.041)
0.005
(0.005)
2.507***
(0.768)
1.157***
(0.165)
-0.231
(0.163)
0
(0.0000)
0.143***
(0.055)
0.782***
(0.084)
1.135***
(0.301)
0.249***
(0.034)
0.001**
(0.001)
1.022***
(0.280)
1.187**
(0.585)
-0.491
(0.349)
0.085
(0.065)
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